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Abhandlungen zur Philosophie und ihrer Geschichte

Herausgegeben von

Professor Dr. R. Falckenberg in Erlangen

4. HEFT

JOHN BALGUY
AN ENGLISH MORALIST OF THE
18TH CENTURY

BY


DR. HUGH DAVID JONES




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ABHANDLUNGEN ZUR PHILOSOPHIE UND IHRER GESCHICHTE

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IN ERLANGEN

HEFT 4

DR. HUGH DAVID JONES: JOHN BALGUY, AN ENGLISH MORALIST
OF THE 18TH CENTURY.



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JOHN BALGUY
AN ENGLISH MORALIST OF THE
18TH CENTURY

BY

DR. HUGH DAVID JONES
C.M. MINISTER
DOWLAIS



1907

VERLAG VON QUELLE & MEYER IN LEIPZIG.

THE
HISTORY OF THE
CITY OF
NEW YORK

FROM THE
FUNDATION OF THE CITY
TO THE PRESENT TIME

PREFACE.

This little book we believe is the first ever written on *John Balguy*. We were compelled, therefore, to concentrate our research mostly on *Balguy's* own writings and those of his contemporaries. The Bibliography attached to the end of this paper enumerates all *Balguy's* existing writings, all that has reference to him, all that directly and some that indirectly bear upon him. It exhausts, we believe, all the sources of information concerning him.

Since this book is intended to be an account of his ethical thought, we have exclusively devoted the latter part to an exposition of his principles from this point of view, and have taken all pains to give an accurate account of his teaching.

HUGH DAVID JONES.

Talafon (Chwilog R.S.O.), January 1907.

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PART I.

BALGUY'S BIOGRAPHY.

Birth. *John Balguy*, a moral philosopher and an eminent divine of the Church of England, was born on the 12th of August 1686 at Sheffield in Yorkshire. He received the rudiments of his education from his father, *Thomas Balguy*, of whom little is known except that he was educated at Cambridge and that afterwards he was Master, for more than thirty years, of the Free Grammar School at Sheffield. He died in the year 1696, when his son *John*, was but ten years of age. A person named Mr. *Daubiz*, succeeded *Thomas Balguy* as Master of the Free School, and the fatherless *John* was kept under his tuition for a considerable time.

Education. In 1702 *Balguy* went to St. John's college Cambridge. At first he showed no signs of being a genuine student, but occupied his time in reading novels. In the third year of his university residence, he came across *Livy*, whose works greatly influenced him and proved the means of drawing his attention to serious studies. In the year 1706 he gained the degree of B. A., and in 1726 that of M. A.

A Teacher. After completing the degree of B. A. he went as a teacher to the Free Grammar School at Sheffield, which was probably still under the supervision of Mr. *Daubiz*. He does not seem to have been long here, for in the year 1708 he became a private tutor in the family of a person named Mr. *Banks*, where he remained about two years.

Enters the Church. In the year 1710 *Balguy* was admitted by the Archbishop of York, to Deacon's orders. In 1711 he was ordained priest by the same prelate. Also, in the same year *Balguy* received the honour of being admitted to the family of a gentleman

named Sir *Henry Liddle*, who secured for him a small preferment, Lamsby and Tanfield, in the County of Durham.

His marriage. In July 1715 he married a lady from Sheffield, who was about his own age, named *Sarah Broomhead*. By her he had only one son, *Thomas Balguy*, who became, through the influence of Bishop *Hoadly*, Archdeacon of Winchester. After his marriage *Balguy* left the Liddles and lived in his own house in the same neighbourhood. This gave him the opportunity of continuing his friendship with them.

Becomes an author. In 1728, under the nom de plume *Silvius*, he entered upon his career as an author. To assume a false name was quite fashionable among authors at this period. The works published under the name "*Silvius*" were all written in defence of Bishop *Hoadly*. This was an undertaking which proved a real success to *Balguy*.

Settles in Northallerton. For in 1727—28 Bishop *Hoadly* made him Prebendary of the Church of Salisbury, and in 1729 he obtained through the influence of the Bishop the vicarage of Northallerton in Yorkshire, where he remained for the rest of his life. This secured to *Balguy* a living of £ 270 a year. His biographer says he could have further improved his position, but owing to his reserved nature "he neglected the usual methods of recommending himself to his superiors".¹ He had several invitations from influential persons, but declined to accept them.

His friends. *Balguy* had many distinguished friends. *Hoadly* and *Clarke* seemed to have been the most intimate. They were in his opinion the greatest living personalities. He was also well acquainted with *Butler*. One conspicuous trait in his character was his love for his friends. His real friends were as dear to him as his own self.

Death. His health and constitution were always feeble. In later years he was compelled to withdraw from all company, except that of a few friends he found at Harrogate, a place which he frequented during his holidays. On the 21st September, 1748, he died at the same place in the sixty third year of his life.

¹ *Biographia Britannica*. See Article on *John Balguy*.

PART II.

BALGUY'S TIMES, WORKS, AND THEIR CHARACTERISTICS.

Introduction. During the span of his active life, *John Balguy*, a spectator of, and a partaker in, the various stirring controversies — religious and ethical — of the early part of the eighteenth century, belonged to a party which may be called the moderate rationalists in religious and ethical opinions. Two factors — Deism and Sentimental Morality — seem to be operative in determining his position. Deism, on the one hand, represented the extreme position of religious rationalism. It was advocated by Lord *Herbert of Cherbury*, *Toland*, *Tindal*, and others. It upheld the notion of reason's sufficiency in all matters of religion, and regarded positive or revealed religion as superfluous. To *Balguy* this view ultimately denied any knowledge of God, and undermined man's responsibility. The sentimental moralists, on the other hand, in his opinion, verged on the other extreme of non-rationalism, and thereby, inverted the proper order of man's nature and his moral standard. They have deduced from this, he says, their erroneous conceptions of man and of God, and regarded them both as governed by brutal and blind instincts. To this class belonged *Shaftesbury*, *Hutcheson*, and many others. The moderate intellectualist aimed at a middle position, or a compromise. Reason is the supreme law of God and the universe. In its nature it is immutable and eternal; everything and everybody should be subsidiary to it and reveal its inherent characteristic, which is order or harmonious relation. Man was and is to be governed by this law. It was the standard of his conduct, but owing to the sentimental aspect of his nature he became the servant of sin, and was con-

sequently unable to recover his lost vigour of rational activity without the direct interference of God. The champions of this position were Dr. *Clarke* and to a certain extent, Bishop *Hoadly*. *Balguay* adopted their view.

These statements are not intended to be an exhaustive classification of the different writers and their opinions during this period, but we believe that they exemplify fairly accurately *Balguay's* conception of, and his attitude towards, his time.

Works. We find it convenient to classify his works as follows:—

(I). Those written in the defence of *Hoadly* under the nom de plume "*Silvius*".

(a.), "*Silvius'* Examination of certain doctrines lately taught and defended by the Rev. Mr. *Stebbing*," 1718.

(b.), "*Silvius'* Letter to The Rev. Dr. *Sherlock*," 1719.

(c.), "*Silvius'* Defence of a Dialogue between a Papist and a Protestant, in answer to the Rev. Mr. *Stebbing*: to which are added several remarks and observations upon that Author's manner of writing," 1720.

(II). Those written in the defence of Dr. *Clarke*. These are mostly ethical in character.

(a.), "The First Letter to a Deist," 1726; Second Edition 1730; Third Edition in 1732 and Fourth Edition 1734.

(b.), "The Foundation of Moral Goodness." (First Part) 1728; Second Edition 1733; Third Edition; Fourth Edition 1734.

(c.), "The Foundation of Moral Goodness" (Second Part) 1729. Second Edition (date not known); Third Edition 1734.

(III). His theological works.

(a.), "The Divine Rectitude, or a brief Enquiry concerning the Moral Perfections of the Deity, particularly in respect of Creation and Providence," 1730.

(b.), "An Essay on Redemption," 1741; Second Edition, Winchester, 1785.

(IV). His works against Deism.

(a.), "His Second Letter to a Deist," 1731; Second Edition 1734.

(b.), "The Law of Truth," 1733; Second Edition 1734.

All the above works, except those written in the defence of *Hoadly* and the "Essay on Redemption", were collected by *Balguj* in one volume, and were dedicated to *Hoadly*, London, 1734, 8vo.

Also, a posthumous collection of all the above works, except those written in the defence of *Hoadly*, were bound in one volume (date not known).

(V). A Volume of Sermons published by *Balguj* himself, 1738—39.

Several of his sermons were also published in the periodicals of his time.

Most of his sermons were collected and published in two posthumous volumes 1790.

For a fuller account of his sermons see Bibliography pages 67—69.

Works in the defence of *Hoadly*. *John Hoadly*, successively Bishop of Bangor, of Salisbury, and of Winchester — a divine of liberal and rational views — belonged to the party known as the Moderate, or the Low Churchmen. In the year 1716, he published his "Preservative against the Principles and Practice of Non-Jurors". Afterwards in the year 1717, he preached his famous sermon on the nature of the kingdom of *Christ*, before the King, which led to what is called, after the Bishop's name, the Bangorian controversy. In his political and ecclesiastical teaching he denied the "divine right" theory whether of priests or of kings. This denial, when applied to religion, is the outcome of Deism. In ecclesiastical quarters his teaching was keenly watched and felt, in their opinion he aimed at undermining one of the most sacred pillars of ecclesiasticism. He took away from the Clergy all superior and authoritative right over men's souls, and lowered the whole order to the ordinary level of human beings. Since the Church is the kingdom of *Christ*, no man, nor party of men, *Hoadly* maintained, had the power to prescribe laws and tyrannise over men's opinions in religious matters. *Christ* himself was the sole lawgiver of his kingdom and he alone was to be obeyed. It was

the duty of men to know, each for himself, the true meaning of *Christ's* commands — each man must strive for their meaning sincerely and with all his heart. Should he fail or err in his endeavour, the attempt would be moral inasmuch as it was truly sincere. Sincerity becomes a moral attitude incumbent on all *Christians*, for, by this attitude towards *Christ's* commands they are ranked among his subjects and become truly governed by him. This outburst of heterodoxy, on the part of *Hoadly*, sounded to the theological warriors of his time as a challenge. Dr. *Andrew Snape*, Provost of Eton College, *Thomas Sherlock*, Dean of Chichester, Dr. *Henry Stebbing* and others defended the cause and dignity of the Church against the traitor; Dr. *Sykes*, Dr. *Whitby*, *Balguy* and others enlisted under the banner of *Hoadly*. A battle of letters, pamphlets, treatises began. One day it became so furious that the great London traffic was brought to a standstill.

Works against Stebbing. *Balguy*, in his "Examination of Certain Doctrines lately taught and defended by the Rev. Mr. *Henry Stebbing*"; endeavours to establish "the innocency of error" in all cases where truth has been sincerely striven for. Like *Hoadly*, *Balguy* believes that "Erroneous opinion, and Wrong Practices, make no *Christian* the less acceptable in God's sight", if such be the outcome of a conscientious effort for truth.¹ Mr. *Stebbing* refutes this opinion. He grants that "sincerity" is commended by God, and that also such an attitude is rewarded in future life, but denies an entrance to the kingdom of Heaven to all but orthodox believers. *Balguy*, on the contrary, believes "sincerity" to be clearly promulgated in the Scripture as the one great condition of man's salvation, and that to possess this attitude is man's first religious duty.

Attached to this tract are two long articles, one on "Excommunication", and one on "Uninterrupted Succession". Mr. *Stebbing* stood for the excommunication of all persons of unorthodox opinions. In this article his views are refuted. *Balguy* says wrong opinions are no breach of the gospel covenant. Identity of opinions is not

¹ *Silvius'* Examination of Certain Doctrines.

essential for the existence and wellbeing of a Church, for if such were the case, there would never have been a Church. Every Church member has a right to form his own opinions and also to express them. Excommunication is just, when indisputable cases of immorality occur or when a poisonous heresy which disturbs the normal equilibrium of the Church is adhered to. God alone is capable of passing ultimate judgment on men's attitude and conduct.

Concerning "Uninterrupted Succession", *Balguy* says, it was ordained by God to be uninterrupted, and that the cases of good dissenters are no breach of it.

Attacks Sherlock. After dealing a blow to *Stebbing*, *Balguy* directs his next to *Sherlock*, and writes his "*Silvius*' Letter to the Rev. Dr. *Sherlock*". The theme of this letter also is "sincerity", and its aim is to explain further this doctrine so as to render it capable of meeting the objection raised to it by *Sherlock*. The argument turns mostly upon the interpretation of passages from the Scripture. One new point is raised, that is, the relation of the doctrine to Roman Catholicism. It, says *Sherlock*, fostered and tolerated Romanism, and made all arguments valueless, when one endeavoured to convert a Papist. Mr. *Stebbing* after a time also propounded the same objection.

Attacks Stebbing once more. This accounts for *Balguy's* third tract in the defence of *Hoadly*. In "*Silvius* Defence of a Dialogue between a Papist and a Protestant", he says, "sincerity" when properly understood is no argument in favour of Papism. For a sincere heart is always open to receive new instruction and light and employs all available means in its effort for truth. What a stubborn Papist does, is to shut his eyes and thereby refuse all argument and light. Should he enter into an unprejudiced argument, unless his understanding be very much depraved, he would soon be convinced of the propriety and utility of a rational endeavour on his part to know the mind of Christ.

This tract produced an immediate reply from *Stebbing*, and *Balguy* prepared an answer to it, but its publication was prevented by *Clarke* and *Hoadly*, who begged of him to drop the argument

and retire from the controversy. This he obeyed, and abandoned all further attempts at defending *Hoadly*.

Ethical Works. After the Bangorian Controversy had ceased, *Balguv* turned his thoughts to moral and theological problems. His first contribution of this kind was his "Letter to a Deist".

The First Letter to a Deist. As far as we know there is no knowledge as to who this Deist was. *Balguv* received from a certain gentleman, who styles himself a Deist, an appeal for his opinion on "*Shaftesbury's* Characteristics" and this letter is his answer. The epistle commences with: "Sir! I have again pursued with fresh pleasure, and fresh concern, the volumes of the Characteristics which you were pleased to present me with some time ago, and I assure you, the condition of impartiality which you imposed on me has been punctually observed. I heartily wish the noble author had been as unprejudiced in writing as I am in reading."¹

Aim of the work. The chief theme of this letter is the refutation of "the low and disadvantageous account" which *Shaftesbury* in his "Enquiry concerning Virtue" had given of religious motives as moral auxiliaries.² *Balguv* maintains that the consideration of rewards and punishments as moral motives or at least as moral auxiliaries in no way introduces elements detrimental to true morality.

Summary. The letter opens, on the one hand, with praise and admiration of, *Shaftesbury's* genius and style, but on the other hand, *Balguv* regrets that such a noble author has an antipathy towards the Clergy and that he sets such ignoble standards as "raillery" and "ridicule" as tests for right reason and truth. After marking a hasty disapproval of such "lamentable errors" as he calls them, he enters upon the principal theme of the letter, which is, the vindication of rewards and punishments as moral auxiliaries. *Shaftesbury*, he says, in his "Enquiry concerning Virtue" carries the notion of disinterested moral motives too far. He himself, by no means approves of that system which is based on self interest.

¹ p. 2. 3rd Edition.

² p. 4. 3rd Edition.

For the conduct of God, which is to be man's pattern, is not determined by self-seeking motives. The world was not created that he might be happier. His conduct is always determined by what is right. The more our actions resemble those of God, the more virtuous they are. When the motive to any action is tinged with self interest, so much is to be subtracted from the moral worth of that action. The kind of self interest which *Balguj* speaks of here is that which seeks the various goods of this world. But, he says there is also another kind, which is the desire for happiness in a future world. This kind, in the first place, is in harmony with real benevolence, nay, even more, it is a condition of benevolence. Those who are guided by meditations on a blessed immortality display a perfect example of real benevolence. For by seeking happiness in the next world they get "peace and tranquility of mind", and are always pleasant and loving towards one another. In other words regard for a future existence contributes to form that "goodness of temper" which according to *Shaftesbury* is indispensable to a healthy benevolence. To reflect upon the fact that we are to dwell together for ever in a world to come ought to endear us to one another in this world and induce us to suffer for each other and bear the burdens of this world. Take away from the mind the thought of a blessed immortality and all these noble social sentiments will be inverted. Instead of love, joy and generosity, we shall find hatred, grief and selfishness; that is, the very opposite of that "goodness of temper" required by *Shaftesbury*. Hence, *Balguj* concludes that regard for a future existence rather than destroying benevolence is a condition of it. Secondly the ignorant and sinful condition of man requires such inducements. Those who have led a sinful life have impaired their reason and are unable to conceive (perceive) the beauty and the intrinsic quality of virtue. God intended the revelation of future rewards and punishments to be an effective means of counteracting the effects of a sinful career, and thereby of awakening reflection which should end in drawing men to do their duty, that is, to strive after virtue for its own sake. Thirdly, the idea of a blessed immortality was a great support to those who suffered and died for their convictions and their endeavours to elevate humanity. But

for such considerations and convictions history would have no martyrs to record. This letter closes with an appeal to the Deist to undertake an unprejudiced study of the New Testament. For were he to do so, he would be convinced that it contains the most excellent benevolence taught and exemplified.

The First Part of the Foundation of Moral Goodness. *Balguys*' "Foundation of Moral Goodness" (First Part) was written in the defence of Dr. *Clarke* against *Hutcheson*. *Hunt*¹ represents *Shaftesbury* as the author attacked in this treatise. Such a view is evidently erroneous,² for this work is an exclusive attack on *Hutcheson*'s moral theory, and only applies to *Shaftesbury* in as much as *Hutcheson* is his disciple. Witness its opening words: "The ingenious Author of the 'Enquiry into the Original of our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue', has written both his Books with so good a Design, is everywhere so instructive and entertaining, and discovers upon all Occasions such a fund of good Nature, as well as good Sense, that I find myself more inclined to join with the Publick in his just Praise, than offer any Objections against his Performance. And indeed it is not without Pain, that I attempt to point out some Particulars wherein I apprehend he has erred."³ Throughout the whole Essay *Balguys* refers exclusively to *Hutcheson*.

Its aim. In this work (also in the second part of his "Foundation of Moral Goodness"), *Balguys*, sets down his fundamental conception of morals. His position is exactly that of Dr. *Clarke*: Morality must be based upon "the eternal and immutable relations of things". Though *Balguys*'s position is like that of Dr. *Clarke*, yet, the end he has in view, that is, the refutation of *Hutcheson*'s moral theory, greatly modifies the temper and contents of his work; for unlike *Clarke* he deals not with man's egoistic propensities and the legislative theory propounded by *Hobbes* as their practical solution, but rather with his benevolent instincts and the superiority of his reason over them. Keeping this point of view in mind we believe *Balguys* makes a great

¹ *Hunt*, "History of Religious Thought in England".

² See the Article on *Balguys* in the *Encyclopaedia Britannica*.

³ p. 41. 4th Edition. See *Balguys*'s Tracts.

effort, the first in our opinion, on the part of the British Intellectualists, to overthrow the sentimental theory of morals. This he endeavours to accomplish by showing that sentiments are not wholly antagonistic to reason, for they may be brought into harmonious relation with it, without even losing their peculiar nature. Such is the case if they execute its commands as being its inferiors. We have, therefore, in this work, an effort, on the one hand, to establish the intellectual nature of God and man as the basis of morality, and on the other hand, to explain the function of sensibility in relation to such a conception.

Summary. As this work will be fully considered in treating of *Balguy's* ethical thought, we shall only give a broad outline of it here. To establish morality, he says, upon instincts, as *Hutcheson* does, has a five-fold disadvantage. First, it makes virtue arbitrary and positive in its nature. It is arbitrary because God can alter and even invert our present instincts, it is positive because instincts (in relation to man's will) are defined and constant in their nature. They influence the will despotically, as it were, from the outside, and thereby destroy freedom which is an essential condition of morality. Secondly, it follows that should any man be without moral instincts he would be, in spite of his reason and liberty of choice, incapable of performing the least moral action. Thirdly, on this foundation brutes must come under the category of moral beings. Fourthly, it follows that the stronger an affection is, the more moral is the action propagated by it, and since these are found in both egoistic and filial dispositions, *Hutcheson's* system becomes self contradictory. Fifthly, "Virtue is depreciated and depraved by so ignoble an original".¹ It is based upon the most unsuitable and unworthy strata in human nature. These difficulties, says *Balguy*, are insurmountable on *Hutcheson's* moral conception, and can only be avoided by placing virtue upon reason, which is the highest principle of man's nature. The same objections hold good also concerning his "moral sense", which becomes useless when the true nature of virtue and reason is properly understood. By establishing virtue, on the

¹ 4th Edition. p. 57. See *Balguy's* Tracts.

other hand, on its proper foundation, that is, on "the reasons of things", its immutable and eternal nature rises into prominence. Morality on such a foundation is, and ought to be, ranked among the sciences and regarded as a species of truth. It can, therefore, be taught and developed like any other true science. The inducement to its performance arises not from man's sentiments, but from his rational nature. The motto should be: "Be virtuous for virtue's sake". This by no means does away with instincts. They were given us by God to be moral auxiliaries, capacities which enable them to retain their nature in a healthy condition.

The second part of the *Foundation of Moral Goodness*. The second part of the "*Foundation of Moral Goodness*" is a further statement of what is contained in the first part. According to popular opinion, *Balguy* was induced to undertake this further explanation by a certain Lord *Lacy*. An anonymous person who had read, unconvinced, the first part of the "*Foundation of Moral Goodness*", sent *Balguy* a set of forty questions on what he considered fallacies in the work.¹ *Balguy* gives a careful answer to each question. This combination of questions and answers makes up what is called "The Second part of the *Foundation of Moral Goodness*".

Contents. The work naturally does not cover the whole ground covered by the first part. It deals mostly with the relation of sentiment to motive. This anonymous inquirer fails to grasp the conception of "virtue, for virtue's sake", but believes sentiment to be prior to all rational determination and virtuous pursuit.

His works on Theology. *Balguy's* next contributions to literature are more theological than ethical in their character. In his "*Divine Rectitude*" and in his "*Essay on Redemption*" he undertakes to further apply and exemplify the principle of rectitude (i. e. the fitness of things) by showing it to be always the principle which underlies God's conduct. His intention was to construct a system of theology based upon the said principle. But his hopes were never fully realised. The two works

¹ See *Balguy's* Biography. *Biographia Britannica*.

mentioned above, may be said to comprise about threefourths of his original plan. The remaining portion, "An Essay on Immortality", was never written. But this defect, to a certain extent, is made good by two sermons¹ that he composed on the subject. These works are not, like those we have already noticed, the outcome of any debate with any particular person or persons, but are rather the embodiment of his reflections and attitude towards the theological thought of his time. For instance, one of the most interesting questions debated dealt with "the first spring of action in the Deity".² A divine named *Grove* said it was wisdom, and another named *Bayes* argued in favour of benevolence, while *Balquy*, again, contended that rectitude is the governing principle of God. Another perplexing question was that concerning the doctrine of redemption. *Sykes*, *Stillingfleet*, and several other divines had all their own points of view regarding this subject. Others again, such as *Tindal*, contended that the whole doctrine was incompatible with divine justice and would not accept it. *Balquy* is dissatisfied with all the notions of contemporary divines and thinks there is no other satisfactory way of explaining the doctrine than according to the principle of rectitude.

The Divine Rectitude. Summary. The essay on "The Divine Rectitude" opens by drawing attention to the various ways in which the character of God is inferred. Men when contemplating the divine character, he says, magnify either their sentiments or ideas. The result is an anthropomorphic conception of God. The only alternative which avoids such an error is one of a purely logical conception. God always acts logically (i. e. according to the fitness of things). If the divine conduct, as shewn in creation, in providence, in the redemption of mankind, and in the gift of immortality, be examined from such a point of view it becomes a logical whole, and conversely, the fact that it becomes a coherent whole testifies that such a way of explaining is the right one.

We pass on, therefore, to show how *Balquy* applies this principle to the divine conduct and, thereby, how he thinks it verifies itself.

¹ Entitled: Natural and Moral Proofs of a Future state.

² See *Balquy's Biography*. *Biographia Britannica*.

Creation. In Creation God had two distinct ends in view. These were the "distribution of happiness" and the "manifestation of order". These ends would be altogether impossible on any other conception except the one which regards the universe as made up of innumerable parts logically related to one another.

Providence. *Balguy* is fully aware that these statements will be severely questioned, for God in his providence appears to many as being an example of an unjust and stupid governor, who suffers mankind to be buffeted and tortured. He, therefore, admits that these ends, though they ought not to conflict with one another, nevertheless do so, and in the sight of men sometimes disappear. Instead of order and happiness there appear to exist but misery and chaos. All this is due to man's own folly. He abused his freedom and became the bondman of sin. Yet, on the other hand, he says, all this has but an appearance of disorder and misery which is only temporal. Evil, he says, is of two kinds, "apparent" and "real". "Apparent evil" is but a mode of discipline employed by God in order to restore men to virtuous conduct. "Apparent evil", therefore, is contrary in no way to order and happiness, for it is used as a means to bring about such ends. "Real evil" again aims directly at the inversion of God's designs. If it could it would reduce the universe to chaos, and happiness to misery. To cope with the effects of such an evil God found it necessary to reveal a plan of salvation through Christ, and to assure mankind that the soul shall dwell for ever in another world, where all evil, either real or apparent, will be amended. What has been regarded as a discord in the world of time, therefore, will be converted into concord in the here-after.

Redemption. *Balguy*, in his "Essay on Redemption", understands Tindal and others to regard the salvation of mankind through *Christ* as utterly incompatible with divine justice. No wonder such objections arise when men like *Sykes* explain the doctrine as a mere Jewish mode of expressing the divine forgiveness, or when others regard the guiltless *Christ* to have suffered and died on behalf of man's sin. The doctrine can be satisfactorily explained to all parties, he says, on the principle he contends for, that is, the fitness of things.

To succeed in explaining it thus, great caution must be taken not to use any terms which are incompatible with the notion of absolute justice. Whole passages of Scripture, in some cases, have to be interpreted figuratively.

Redemption, when properly defined, means "the deliverance from the power and punishment of sin by the meritorious sufferings of Jesus Christ". When thus defined the doctrine of redemption is freed from the barbaric idea of giving satisfaction to God and from the contention that Christ acted as a substitute for the punishment due to man. The transferring of guilt from one person to another is impossible and therefore, vicarious punishment is impossible. Christ's sufferings were meritorious, and because he suffered on behalf of mankind they can be called vicarious sufferings. In a word they were "premier" and not "penal". As his sufferings were meritorious he has procured the favour of God and the indemnity of sinners, and has thus revealed a means to secure mankind from the power and punishment of sin, that is, from the effects of what *Balquy* calls "real evil".

Immortality. But the effects of "real evil" on mankind cannot be wholly eradicated in this world. To restore the lost harmony, the soul must be immortal. The chaotic aspect and the miserable condition of this world is an argument, from the fitness of the case, for the immortality of the soul. For if it is not immortal then it ends its career in a world which to all appearance is full of misery and disorder. Not only is such an idea absurd, but also it reflects upon the just character of God. For he must be either an unjust, unmerciful and cruel ruler, else he would not have allowed men to be buffeted and tortured during their short span of life, or, he has been defeated by some other power in carrying out his designed purpose, and is, therefore, helpless to aid his miserable creatures. No, neither of these postulates can be right. To think and to speak thus of the almighty and perfect God would be blasphemy. The conclusion is then, that the soul is immortal and that the designed ends of God will be fully realised in the world to come.

Also, revelation and the nature of the soul itself, proves it to be immortal.

His works against Deism. In all his writings, theological and otherwise, *Balguy* does not fail, when opportunity arises, to assail Deism. But besides indirectly attacking the school he has also directly attacked it. He wrote his "Second Letter to a Deist" against *Tindal's* "Christianity as old as the Creation" (1730), and his "Law of Truth" against the principles of Deism in general.

The Second Letter to a Deist. "The Second Letter to a Deist" was probably written tho the same person as the first. This anonymous deist had asked *Balguy* whether the arguments of *Tindal*, particularly those against Dr. *Clarke*, did not prove revelation to be needless. The principal queries of the essay, and their answers are as follows: In the first place, *Balguy* is asked: Is not "the light of nature" as explained by *Tindal* a sufficient guide of men's conduct, and therefore, is not revelation superfluous? Also, he asks has Dr. *Clarke* not admitted the sufficiency of such a light, and yet contends revelation to be necessary? Does *Clarke* thereby not contradict himself? *Balguy* answers that *Tindal* had grossly misunderstood Dr. *Clarke*. For he had failed to notice the distinction the Doctor had made between "the law of Nature", which is absolute and perfect, and "the light of Nature" whose power is in proportion to the purity of man's reason. The Doctor had never cast a slur on "the law of Nature", as such, but had always emphasised its absolute and perfect character, and also its sufficiency to guide anyone who was able to conceive it. At the same time, he had emphasised the deterioration that had taken place, through sin, in man's reason, and which rendered him incapable, without help, of conceiving the all perfect law. To regard such propositions as contradictory, says *Balguy*, is absurd. Secondly, is *Tindal* not right when he says that it is an insult to human nature and to its Creator to represent its perfect embodiment in one pair alone? *Balguy* says, that human beings had no argument for claiming the possession of a perfect nature. When our first parents received such a nature, it was not because God was obliged to bestow it upon them, but they received it rather as a token of his goodwill. The present condition of human nature is far below the standard possessed by our

first parents, but its deterioration is entirely due to man's disobedience. Thirdly, has not *Tindal* shown that it is incompatible with God's justice and love to favour a small class of people with the secrets of his character and the way of their salvation, while leaving thousands of human beings to grope in darkness and perish? No, says *Balguv*, for to treat every man, or class of men, differently is no argument against God's rectitude and love, but rather an argument confirming it. Once the principle of "the fitness of things" is thoroughly grasped it becomes clear that the irregular distribution of God's goods is a necessity. A better example of this can nowhere be found than that supplied by his irregular distribution of natural goods. No one regards such a distribution as a slur on God's just character, but rather regards it as the only manner of exemplifying the perfection of his works. Logically the same irregularity is equally justifiable in his distribution of spiritual goods. Fourthly, *Tindal* says that ultimately Christianity and Deism are the same. Is he not right? No! for Christianity is the manifestation of God's will through Jesus Christ and Deism is the knowledge of his will by means of reason. *Balguv* brings this letter to a close by refuting *Tindal's* view that rewards and punishments involve selfish elements which are detrimental to true morality. For, says he, considering the depravity of man's reason, it is evident that he stands in need of help.

The Law of Truth. The essay styled "The Law of Truth" opens with a long preface reinstating the principles expounded in the essay on "The Divine Rectitude". We consider it therefore unnecessary to repeat them here. Hence, we pass over the preface and consider the essay itself.

"The Law of Truth" possesses at least two aspects, a rational aspect and a revealed aspect. These are the means by which the nature of truth and God can be known. This fact has been often overlooked by various writers. Some enthusiastically contend that reason is sufficient in itself for the purpose, while others maintain that the whole nature of truth is experienced by a blind belief in revelation. The advocates of either of these contentions, because of their onesidedness are wrong. Both aspects, owing to the nature

of things, are absolutely necessary. Their inter-dependence may be explained as follows: In the first place, truth as it is known by reason is the one universal and absolute foundation of everything. In contemplating it we become aware and are convinced of its self-obligatory nature. Nothing but truth has absolute authority. It derives its authority from nowhere outside of its own nature, while anything which claims any pretence to authority must receive such a mandate from truth before it can be real. In the second place, religion — natural or revealed — since it is based upon truth, possesses all the imperativeness or obligation of truth itself. Hence the obligations of revealed religion, as such, have the same claim upon men as those of natural religion, as such. They are both self-obligatory. Hence, in the third place, since natural religion and revelation both rest on the same foundation, their interests and purposes cannot be antagonistic. But, on the contrary, rather than weakening or destroying each other, they supplement each other's defects and thereby furnish an example of a complete religion — a religion that meets all the needs of humanity, based upon the most impregnable foundation.

Sermons. During the first four years of his preferment, *Balguy* wrote a new sermon every week, and continued the habit more or less regularly throughout his lifetime. At one time he committed 250 of them to the flames so as not to tempt his son to lead an indolent life by using them, and, thereby, he induced him to follow his own industrious example.

His sermons deal mostly with the controversial topics of the day. For an account of their various subjects see Bibliography pages: 67, 68, 69.

According to *Balguy's* biographer¹ his sermons ought to be regarded among the best preached in the English language.

THEIR CHARACTERISTICS.

External features. *Balguy* does not seem to have aimed at any special style of composition. His mind is always occupied with the

¹ *Thomas Balguy*. See *Biographia Britannica*.

problem he expounds, and the language he employs is to him of secondary importance. Being an intellectualist he moves somewhat heavily, as if he is half conscious of the burden of his conceptions. When compared with Clarke he may be called a fairly lucid writer. He is not guilty of long sentences covering half a page, with the minimum of thought and the maximum of confusion, nor is he guilty of extravagant use of mathematical illustrations; but in spite of his being free from these defects of his master, he cannot claim to be unambiguous. It is difficult, almost impossible, at times to know his exact meaning. Even after a careful reading of a treatise whole sentences remain dark and light only dawns by bringing one work to explain the other. He continually repeats his arguments; this being probably due to his intense convictions and to his desire to impress them upon others. His employment of philosophical terms also is very loose.

His lack of literary art. A remark of his biographer¹ may be mentioned here. He believes that the time spent by *Balguy* in reading romances during the first two years of his residence at Oxford was not altogether unprofitable, as *Balguy* himself maintained; for they may have had the effect of giving vigour to his imagination and were therefore beneficial to his literary efforts. But this remark seems to us to be groundless. What is really characteristic of *Balguy's* writings is the lack of imaginative vigour — the lack of poetical colouring and fine rhetoric. In the choice and use of his illustrations he often displays very inferior taste. Some are really puerile and below the dignity of any person claiming to himself the character of a philosopher. For instance, notice the following extracts from an argument of his, proving the necessity and use of revealed religion:

“Let us suppose Men to enjoy naturally all the Light that he allows for the Direction of their Conduct: might they not nevertheless go astray, and want to be reduced? In clear Daylight, and open Sunshine, may not a Traveller take a wrong Road; and wander on till he bewilder himself? Perhaps some amusing

¹ *Thomas Balguy*. See *Biographia Britannica*.

Object catches his Eye, and tempts him aside. Perhaps it detains him there; and so far engages his Mind, as to make him forget both his Road and his Journey. Is all Advice, all Assistance, in such a Case needless? Is it not, on the contrary, very desirable, that some Friend wiser than himself, should providentially interpose to awaken and admonish him; or, leading him gently by the Hand, bring him back into the Way from whence he has erred? Should he moreover, to prevent the like Excursions for the future, assure him, that the Affair he is going about is of infinitely greater Consequence than he imagined; and that his Welfare entirely depends on his Diligence and Expedition. Should he press him with the greatest Earnestness to pursue his Journey vigorously and without Deviation or Trifling; and to encourage him the more effectually, should he promise him his Company and Assistance to the far end; and undertake, if he were not wanting to himself, to carry him through all Difficulties that he might happen to meet with; Would such Offices as these be useless; or such Offers contemptible? If this Traveller should refuse the Aid of such a Friend, and reject his kind Proposals; if he should tell him, that he had Light enough upon his Hands, and that he knew his Road and his Business; and therefore was determined not to go back with him; but to take his own Time, and his own Measures; if he should further declare, that he thought him too officious; and that he had no occasion either for his Help, or his Counsel; would not anyone who knew the Case, conclude that Man doubly lost; and that he was out of his Wits, as well as out of his Way?"¹

Again:

"If any Philosopher happened to wander never so widely, or to be even quite lost; could the Rules of Morality, the Reasons and Relations of Things, be lost with him? Whatever Accidents or Misfortunes he might meet with in the wide Sea; could Truth, eternal Truth, be sunk or ship-wrecked? To speak plainly, the Law of Nature, for that very Reason, because it is unchangeable,

¹ The Second Letter to a Deist. 2nd Edition. pp. 279—80.

neither has nor can have any Dependence on Human Understandings. But why should it seem strange, that Men should wander in the wide Sea, without Revelation; when we find they still wander there, even with it? Is it not much stranger, that in these Days, Men should fail without the Compass; and venture, at the same time, to be every Man his own Pilot? None of the ancient Philosophers could wander more widely, more wilfully, more desperately, than this very Author,¹ who despising the Lights of Heaven trusts all to his own Arm, and his own Rudder; and that upon a very unsound, and infirm Bottom.”²

Further, no one can regard the following as an example of the highest taste:

“Since Men have, and always had, this perfect Law (law of nature); what Occasion for Prophets and Revelation? I answer, as I did before, that supposing this perfect Law perfectly known; which was not the Case; still they had the same Occasion for Prophets and Revelation, that they have for Physicians and Medicines. Mankind had broken their Constitution, contracted very ill Habits, and laboured under a Complication of Distempers. Their Vitals were touched, and they were become even sick unto Death.”³

These examples have been taken from his “Second Letter to a Deist”, which in our opinion is his best work from a literary point of view, and yet that which possesses the least merit from a logical standpoint. His “First Letter to a Deist” and his tracts on “Sincerity” also belong to this class. On the whole the external features or style of his works attract no one; their charm mostly lies in their inner beauty.

The Inner features of his Works. *Balguy*, though deficient in the architectonic grandeur of composition is nevertheless able to impress upon the reader that what he writes is a direct manifestation of his convictions and personality.

¹ Tindal.

² The Second Letter to a Deist. 2nd Edition. p. 309.

³ The Second Letter to a Deist. 2nd Edition. pp. 321—22.

A better example of an internal warmth permeating a man's theoretical notions can not easily be found. This proportionate combination of sentiment and logic has indeed its own peculiar charm. Those sentences of his which are stiff and gloomy when isolated from their context receive new life when examined in their excogitative setting. No one can fail to feel the thrill of the sincerity of some of his reasoned out paragraphs. They vibrate with the emotions of a soul in search for truth. Their inward light beams forth with intensity, overpowers our sentiments and demands our respect.

His Spirit. In a tract¹ issued to enumerate the authors and works of the "Bangorian Controversy" the gentleness of *Balguy's* spirit is pointed out as compared with the harshness of other writers during this strife. The pamphlets published on this occasion were full of personal enmity and imputations. "Never was such a waste of human passion," says *Leslie Stephen*.² But *Balguy* is elevated by the author of this tract to the higher plane of an unprejudiced critic. Comparing his writings with those of others at this time, he deserves praise for keeping his anger and passion under control, or rather, deserves praise for not being overwhelmed and swayed by irrational and base temper. But to say that he never showed anger and hatred during this strife would be totally wrong. In his letter to Dr. *Sherlock* he is roused to a pitch of anger which bursts out so furiously that it verges almost on indecency. Another proof of his turbulent spirit on this occasion is given us by his biographer who relates the trouble *Hoadly* and *Clarke* had had in persuading him from taking further part in the controversy.³ On other occasions also, evidences can be found of *Balguy* being greatly prejudiced. In his "Second Letter to a Deist" there is a certain tone of impatience, tinged with contempt, against the author of "Christianity as old as the Creation". It is, he says, "a pompous book", "a show", "a mixture of mire

¹ Biographical and Literary Tract. London 1782. 4rd British Museum. 132. C. 4.

² English Thought in the 18th Century. Vol. II. p. 157.

³ See above p. 7.

and mud", "a collection of data which proves nothing", "a compiled example of empty exclamations". These are no utterances of a "gentle spirit" nor of an unbiassed mind.

But yet, we find a strong vein of "gentle spirit" running through his works especially in those that are not involved in furious controversy. In his "First Letter to a Deist" and his "Foundation of Moral Goodness" he goes out of the way to apologise for the position he has taken against the authors whom he refutes in these works.¹ They are to him master writers with the very best intentions, and he deeply laments the ill fortune of their opinion being false, or at any rate contrary to his own and that of Dr. *Clarke*. In the most gentlemanly spirit, and in spite of a desire to be silent, he refutes their opinions. For, he says,² he is induced by certain convictions to defend the honour and dignity of virtue and truth.

These examples disclose the inward characteristics of his works, which though not altogether faultless, yet when compared with their external features cast somewhat pleasant and attractive rays — rays that are caused by a pure, unhidden soul.

His Conception of style inferred. *Balguj's* conception of literary style may be inferred from his remarks on the beautiful.³ The beautiful he maintains is a species of truth and it therefore consists of logical relations. Hence, we may justly say that to him any literary production consistent with itself is a feat of considerable value. When he examines any work from the point of view of its style or character he dwells on the emotions or the sentiments of the author rather than on the form of their expression or crystallization. Whether an author is sincere or insincere, consistent or inconsistent seems to be the main point on which *Balguj* dwells when treating of any work as a literary composition.

¹ See their opening pages.

² See the opening pages of "The Foundation of Moral Goodness".

³ "The Foundation of Moral of Goodness". 4th Edition. p. 62. See also below p. 34.

PART III.

BALGUY'S ETHICAL THOUGHT.

Introduction. In the previous chapter we have endeavoured to show the historical context, the contents, and the style of *Balguy's* works, and have found them to be the outcome of the various controversies — ethical and theological — of his time. Taking these works as the sole index of his thought he could be examined from at least two points of view, that of the theologian, and that of the moralist. In this essay we are concerned with the latter point of view and shall only dwell on the former to such an extent as may be necessary to illustrate the ethical.

General Outline. To a modern logician his thought is a pitiful spectacle of contradiction and a mixture of heterogeneous doctrines, while to *Balguy* himself it was a coherent whole, with its various aspects welded into a systematic unity having "rectitude" or "the fitness of things" as their underlying category. A superficial glance at his thought will be of help to a closer analysis. God is the prime source of all being and becoming; both the material and the spiritual worlds, with all their contents, find their being through His commands, and have been sustained to this day and will be till the end of time by the power of His just will. He also enjoys infinite wisdom, love, and free power; though infinite in His capacity he must not, and can not, transgress the necessary limit which is intrinsic in His just nature. God in all His acts is guided by "the law of truth" or "the fitness of things". In the creation of Man, God thought it fit to create him after his own image, a loving, a free, and an intelligent being, who ought always to act like God his Father, according to the dictates of his reason, and "the fitness of things". This duty on the part of man was not long observed,

the voice of reason was disregarded, passion and lust became the motives of his conduct, till at last the once perfect being became a bondman of sin. But this is a condition that should not be, for it has introduced discord into a system where perfect harmony should exist. This was repugnant, therefore, to the divine and perfect nature. Hence according to the necessity of the case, God provided a means through Christ and revelation to elevate and restore man to the standard of his original duty, that he might once more harmonise with the great system of reality and truth.

Classification. To make a further analysis of these general remarks we find it convenient to classify them as follows: (I). The ideal man, who should continually obey the law of reason, or the logic of reality. (II). The fallen condition of man. (III). The means revealed by God to restore man to his lost ideal state.

(I). THE IDEAL MAN.

Balquy's general conception of human nature. Human nature is compounded of heterogeneous elements denominated body and mind. These with their various properties were so wonderfully put together by God, that at first they existed in mutual peace and unity. Of these elements the mind, which is spiritual is vastly superior to the body which is material; and of their respective properties, reason and sensibility, the former is more important than the latter. A student of human nature must be on his guard that he does not emphasise the one at the expense of the other. His duty is to explain both elements separately, assigning to each of them its special functions, and afterwards, to exhibit them in their co-operative unity. But this careful examination has been badly neglected by philosophers in the past. Take, for example, the Epicureans and the Stoics; these parties have divided human nature between them, and have done it gross injustice by such a partial attitude towards it. The former party "forgetting themselves to be moral Agents, regarded only sensibility, or if they admitted Virtue it was from the point of view of ministering to Pleasure".¹ The

¹ Second Part of The Foundation of Moral Goodness. 3rd Edition. Answer. 40.

latter party, again, “forget themselves to be sensitive Beings, overlook Natural Good, and regarded only Morality, or if they admitted Pleasure it was only that which is produced by Virtue”.¹ These one sided views of human nature must not be tolerated, for “the rejecting of Moral Good is highly unreasonable, and therefore unnatural, the rejecting of Sensible Good is very unnatural, and therefore unreasonable”.² Man, as a rational being, should always be governed by reason, should determine all his conduct by logical consideration, and as a sensible being, he would do injustice to that aspect of his nature by not seeking its gratification in natural good.

Mind and body as represented by their respective aspects, reason and sense, are passive in their nature. In the gap between them God has inserted the will, active in its nature, and having the free choice of becoming the executor to the dictates of reason, or of allowing itself to be employed in the service of sensibility. God has intended the will to execute the commands of reason, and to strive for virtue. In this capacity, and in this alone, it can properly serve sensibility; for since reason is the supreme law of man's nature, all the other properties must be subordinate to it. Without this, the co-operative unity of mind and body, reason and sense, is impossible, and where peace and unity were intended there will exist but war and chaos.

Following, therefore, the plan suggested by *Balquy*, though not followed out by himself, we shall endeavour to examine separately the functions he assigned to reason and sensibility, and afterwards their ideal co-operation.

(A). THE RATIONAL ASPECT OF MAN'S NATURE.

Method. *Balquy* being a great admirer and disciple of Dr. *Clarke*, naturally adopts his method. In his opinion there was never made in the history of theology and philosophy anything so satisfactory and impregnable as the contributions of the great latitudinarian to “*Boyle's Lectures*”. Though *Balquy* was a clergyman of the Church of England, he criticises scripture, does away with parts of

¹ Second Part of The Foundation of Moral Goodness. 3rd Edition. Answer. 40.

² *Ibid.* •

it, and alters its meaning to suit his own purpose; though he also kneels in admiration and worship before the great effort made by his master to construct a work that would serve christianity as *Newton's* "Principia" served astronomy. He accepts the teaching of *Clarke* almost as if it were infallible. His works, he says,¹ will remain among the great wonders of the English language as long as it lasts. Naturally therefore, the deductive method becomes the chief inheritance of *Balguay*. Everything must be viewed from the a priori standpoint, that is, the standpoint of universal principles, intuitively or rationally conceived. This method had yielded to *Clarke* suitable and indisputable fundamental truths upon which he demonstrated beyond doubt the existence and attributes of God, and the reasonableness of the christian religion. He followed the method of Euclid in his pursuit of geometrical science, and thereby discovered the axioms and propositions of a rational theology. Scientists of the other branches of knowledge ought, says *Balguay*, to adopt the same method. With these convictions *Balguay* applies this method to the science of Ethics with an undisturbed confidence that one day, though probably not in his time, men would realise a science of ethics that would outshadow in fineness and accuracy even that of mathematics. It is indeed true, that his chief aim was not to enter upon such a stupendous task, but rather to apply and defend the doctrine of *Clarke* against such erroneous philosophers as *Shaftesbury* and *Hutcheson*, who, to him, had degraded the character of virtue by their incorrect method and foundation. *Balguay* endeavours to show that this is the only method by which ethical knowledge can be acquired: it is one of reason's innate characteristics. Induction on the other hand, has closer relation to the phenomena of sense, and is therefore, just as the body is inferior to the mind, inferior to deduction, and can only be used as its auxiliary.

Terms. *Balguay* is rather ambiguous in the employment of his terms. Virtue is made identical with truth and with happiness; "God", he says, "has made us capable of Truth, Virtue, and Happiness", . . . "so great is, or will be, the harmony among

¹ The Second Letter to a Deist. 2nd Edition. p. 301.

them, that they may rather be looked upon as one and the same end, than as distinct and several. The foundation of virtue is truth, and the foundation of happiness, virtue".¹ Also, a moral action may be called a "true" or a "right" action, but for the sake of accuracy "right action" is preferred. Though he mentions this preference to "right action", he employs both terms to convey the same idea. What he seems to mean is, that "truth" is the proper word to denominate the ideal and abstract relations of things as they exist in God, and that "right action" should be employed to denominate the conformity to such a standard. Hence "truth" is absolute in its significance while "right" is but relative. "Happiness", also, seems to have a relative meaning. It is truth made conscious. The words "pleasure" and "gratification" can only be used in reference to natural good, but the sum total of pleasure, together with a knowledge of truth, may be denominated by the word "happiness".

Definitions. No less than a dozen definitions of morality are given us by *Balguy*, and all are said to have the same meaning. Witness these examples: "Morality of Actions consists in Conformity to Reason, and Deformity from it"² . . . "Virtue is acting according to the absolute Fitness of Things, or agreeably to the Natures and Relations of Things."³ "Virtue consists in the Conformity of our Wills to our Understanding."⁴ "Morality is a rational Endeavour of producing Happiness in capable Subjects."⁵ All these definitions and their like are roughly speaking synonymous and centre in the same idea. It is not therefore necessary, he says,⁶ to examine each by itself, but to expound the general conception they severally contain.

His Fundamental Conception of Morality. "The Foundation of Virtue is Truth."⁷ Truth is the basis of morality with *John Balguy*. Truth, as observed before, consists of an abstract, yet real and absolute, objective system of relations, immutable and

¹ The First Part of The Foundation of Moral Goodness. 4th Edition. p. 103.

² Ibid. p. 66.

³ Ibid. p. 66.

⁴ Ibid. p. 66.


⁵ Ibid. p. 66.

⁶ Ibid. p. 67.

⁷ Ibid. p. 103.

eternal, in the nature of God. Truth underlies the existence of all kinds of reality, or in *Balguy's* language "Relations between Things or Persons, are their comparative States or Modes of Existence, necessarily arising from their different Natures or Circumstances. — Whether Relations be Qualities inherent in external Natures, or not: or however they may be defined, or conceived, they are certainly real, unalterable, and eternal. That is, supposing those Natures always continuing to be what they are, the Relations intervening between them are invariable. However, the Relations between Ideas are strictly necessary and unchangeable; the Ideas themselves being so in the divine Understanding."¹ God, and God alone, has the power to comprehend and conceive this vast system of relations at a glance. To Him it is one stupendous and harmonious whole. All his acts, therefore, exhibit the perfection of truth, for He always acts from the point of view of the whole and in conformity to the whole. But in the case of man it is different. He is but a portion of the infinite, and is therefore, in comparison to God, a finite being. Even in his perfect state he had not the capacity to comprehend truth in its totality. He could, and can only conceive it from different standpoints, as for example that of mathematics, that of mechanics, that of morals, etc. In other words, truth is conceived by man not as a whole, but in parts. It is the great universal "genus", God alone who can view the whole "genus". What man can do is to examine its various species.

The various Species of Truth.



¹ The First Part of The Foundation of Moral Goodness. 4th Edition. p. 68

Subjective Truth. Subjective truth is very vaguely defined by *Balguy*. A remark here and there in his writings is the only clue to its meaning. It seems to consist in a certain attitude on the part of man towards reality or the order of things. An example of an attitude which is contrary to this is that of the Atheist. Atheism is a rebellion in man's sentiments and opinions against God. To disbelieve the law and light of reason is to set up a system of individual fancies antagonistic to the true order of things. Hence subjective error is an extreme example of a theoretical immorality. It is a wilful error and aims at undermining the immutable and eternal moral order. It is true that a person may helplessly err in his opinions concerning the moral standard or truth, but if he is sincere in his attitude towards God and truth his error is not immoral. He is not like the atheist, for the atheist voluntarily errs, he wishes in his heart that there was no God. His innermost soul has changed its essence and, as it were, has become an instance of error in itself.

Objective Truth. Concerning the second division of truth *Balguy* is more definite. "Truth, objectively considered, is either of Words, Ideas, or Things. By which last (things) I mean external Natures."¹

Verbal truth. First, by verbal truth he means the truth of propositions. These are correct if they correspond with the objects they propose to denominate. They may refer to ideas, or things exclusively, or to both at the same time. In their nature, therefore, they are relative, and hence they are not qualified to be a sound and a sure basis of morality.

Ideal Truth. Secondly, ideal truth is the agreement or disagreement of ideas. "That Ideas correspond or differ, agree or disagree with each other, will be readily allowed, whether such Agreements or Disagreements be formed into Propositions or no. The Differences among them constitute various Relations, which are fixed and certain, independently of our Observations."¹ This ideal

¹ The First Part of The Foundation of Moral Goodness. 4th Edition. p. 71.

system of relations, says *Balguy*, is a sufficient basis for mathematics, but not for morals. This we shall endeavour to show later on.

The Relations of things. Thirdly, the species of truth known as “the relations of things” is vague and wide. It refers to man’s environment and his relation to it. Man’s environment, as *Balguy* points out, consists of various kinds of relations. “There is”, he says, “a wide Difference between the Nature of rational Creatures and that of Brutes; and between the nature of Brutes, and that of inanimate Things.”¹ Hence, he infers that they respectively require a suitable treatment. “To treat Men,” he says, “in the same Way we treat Brutes, and to treat Brutes in the same Way we do Stocks and Stones, is manifestly as disagreeable and dissonant to the Nature of Things, as it would be to attempt the forming of an angle with two parallel Lines.” . . . “I call,” he says, “such conduct a counteraction to the Truth, or real Nature of Things.”¹

Balguy owing to such considerations finds it necessary to subdivide the wider notion denominated “the relations of things” into things inanimate and things animate. The latter again he further subdivides into men and brutes.

Of Things Inanimate. With the unconscious universe and its existing relations morality has no concern. Man’s conduct in relation to it comes under the category of natural good. “To treat or use an insensible Object conformably to Reason, or according to what it is, though it may be a right Action, yet is indifferent in respect of Morality; which only concerns our Behaviour to such Beings as are, at least, sensible.”² By this last term he means “conscious”.

Of Things Animate. The moral foundation, therefore, must be founded upon relations existing between conscious beings. Such relations, says *Balguy*, are as real as any species of relations. They consist of “Agreements and Disagreements, between Actions, Agents, and Objects. Some Actions are very different from,

¹ The First Part of The Foundation of Moral Goodness. 4th Edition. pp. 72, 73.

² Ibid. p. 67.

and even contrary to, others.”¹ Thus having narrowed the sphere of morality to the relations existing between conscious beings, *Balguy* is able to define morality as “a rational Endeavour of producing Happiness in capable Subjects.”² Or when he employs his ordinary definition that, “Virtue is the Conformity of our Moral Actions to the Reasons of Things”,³ he is able to supplement it by the words “Moral Actions are such as are knowingly directed towards some Object, intelligent or sensible”.⁴ Such a modification of the notion “the relations of things” seems to be a peculiar device of *Balguy*. He may fairly claim to be its originator.⁵

Truth and Happiness. By thus restricting morality to the sphere of conscious beings *Balguy* is able to identify truth and happiness. Happiness is the effect of moral truth upon the mind when realised in action. In speaking of the effect of a right treatment upon brutes the word “agreeable” is more suitable. Brutes are outside the sphere of morality except in so far as they reciprocate the effect of man’s dealings towards them. When such an effect is agreeable to their nature, it testifies to the rightness of the human action. Brutes are objects of morality but can never be subjects of it because of their irrationality. Putting brutes aside except in the above sense, the relation of truth and happiness in the human consciousness is that of cause and effect. Logically truth is the foundation of morality, and happiness is the edifice built upon that foundation.

The relations of Things, the best Moral foundation. Having thus described *Balguy*’s moral foundation we next seek his reasons for adopting one species of truth rather than another for such a purpose. The claim of propositions, the first species of truth, can be easily dispensed with, for they have no existence except that which is relative.

¹ The First Part of The Foundation of Moral Goodness. 4th Edition.
p 72.

² Ibid. p. 66.

³ Ibid. p. 67.

⁴ Ibid. p. 67.

⁵ See *Brown’s Criticism*, below p. 59, 60.

Ideas, the second example of truth, have a greater claim to be the basis of morality. For of the science of mathematics, owing to its total a priori nature, they are the sole foundation. This science is exclusively based upon intuitions or innate ideas. It is independent of all empirical content, and has, therefore reached its present perfection without any help from the external world. But in the case of morals this purely ideal foundation, in respect of man,¹ lacks that absolute character it possesses in the case of mathematics. Morality is a-practical, as well as a theoretical science. It has reference to conduct and investigates its underlying principles. It can be intuitively conceived that there ought to be an agreement between the gratitude of A and the kindness of B; and a disagreement between the ingratitude of C and the bounty of D. But a purely theoretical comparison of the relations existing between these ideas may not correspond to their actual relations in society and in God. Hence for the purpose of moral science, they must be verified by existing social relations. That is, moral ideas are meaningless without reference to the external world. In the matter of morals the mind only compares and judges. Its materials for comparing and judging must be supplied to it from without. *Balguy* therefore maintains, it is better and more accurate to base morality on "the relations of (animate) things" than on their corresponding ideas in the mind.

Morality and Mathematics. It is interesting to note here the slight advance made by *Balguy* on *Clarke's* view in regard to mathematics and morals. *Clarke* in his treatment of ethics (also of theology) presses the analogy between mathematics and morals too far. He does more than adopt the mathematical method as such, for he often transcends the limits of the bare method till the reader loses all sight of the fundamental difference between the two sciences; that is, he treats morality, which may be said to be a qualitative science, as if it occupied itself with quantitative relations. *Balguy* is free to a great extent from this confusion. He adopts, he tells us, the mathematical method² — and only the method — for

¹ But not so with God.

² The Second Part of The Foundation of Moral Goodness. 2nd Edition.
Answer 2.

moral science. It is to him the one universal method for the investigation of truth of any kind. He therefore, unlike *Clarke*, clearly states that mathematics and morals are sciences of a different kind. His mathematical allusions have but a "figurative significance" when applied to morals; they are used by him as examples to illustrate the nature of truth. Thus, he says, "Between the Ideas of Bounty and Gratitude there is a manifest Congruity, which is commonly called Moral Fitness" "What is it then that knits these Ideas together, and establishes the Conformity between them? Is the Agreement arbitrary, or dependent on the Will of any Agent? No, not even the Creator's. It springs from the same Necessity of Nature that makes the Three Angles of a Triangle equal to two Right ones, or that fixes a certain Proportion between a Cone, and a Cylinder of the same Base and Height. Can then such an Equality or Proportion be ascribed to those Moral Ideas, as belongs to these Mathematical ones? Those Terms are used and applied to both Kinds, but not precisely in the same Sense. They belong originally to Ideas of Quantity; and when they are used to denote Moral Fitness, their Signification is somewhat figurative. But concerning the Meaning or Propriety of Terms, I have no Dispute at present. However the Agreement between Moral Ideas may be denominated or distinguished, what I contend for is, that the Ideas themselves invariably bear such Relation to each other; which are no less certain, and oftentimes more immediately evident than the Equality or Proportion between the forementioned Angles and Figures."¹

The beautiful, a species of truth. According to *Balguy's* contention, the beautiful must also be brought under the category of truth. His opinion concerning this species underwent a considerable change. When he wrote his "Foundation of Moral Goodness" he maintained that the beautiful was a matter of taste or rather of congenital endowment. Later, when the third edition of the above works was published, he emphatically denied the truth of his

¹ The 2nd Part of The Foundation of Moral Goodness. 2nd Edition Answer 2.

former view. Thus, he says, "Since the first Publication of these Papers, I have been convinced, that all Beauty, whether Moral or Natural, is to be reckoned and reputed as a Species of Absolute Truth; as resulting from, or consisting in, the necessary Relations and unchangeable Congruities of Ideas and by Consequence, that in order to the Perception of Beauty, no other Power needs to be supposed, than what is merely intellectual."¹

Reason, the only moral faculty. *Balguy*, in opposition to the Sentimentalists, founds his fundamental conception of morals on "truth" or "the fitness of things". Morality is a species of truth. By this procedure he clears the way, on the one hand, to deny the existence of what *Hutcheson* called the "moral Sense" as an organ to conceive moral relations; and on the other hand, to establish the claim and qualification of reason for such a purpose. *Hutcheson*, says *Balguy*, by introducing the "moral Sense" as a medium of moral conception, in the first place, undermines the absoluteness and intrinsic value of virtue; and thereby in the second place, makes it to depend wholly upon the taste of an individual, which presupposes therefore the existence, without any common factor, of manifold moral standards; that is, each individual can claim an exclusive right to regard his own particular moral taste as a criterion of what is virtuous. Virtue, therefore, instead of having that universal application and absolute existence which it really has, is erroneously made to have but a particular and a relative significance. Had *Hutcheson*, says *Balguy*, properly investigated the nature of morality, and also the qualification of reason as compared with that of sense, for moral purposes, he would probably have become convinced of the fallacy of his fundamental conception and of the uselessness of what he calls "moral Sense". We call upon *Balguy* to speak for himself against *Hutcheson*. Thus, he says, "Reason, or Intelligence, is a Faculty enabling us to perceive, either immediately or mediately, the Agreement or Disagreement of Ideas, whether natural or moral. This last Clause, otherwise superfluous, is inser-

¹ The Foundation of Moral Goodness (First Part). 4th Edition. p. 62. See also pp. 72, 121—22.

ted upon our Author's¹ Account; who seems to exclude moral Ideas, and to consider them as Objects of another Faculty. And, indeed, if he had thought our Understandings capable of moral Perceptions, he would have had no Occasion for introducing his 'moral Sense', except in Relation to "To Kalon", concerning which I have already acknowledged myself undetermined. But it is visible, that he ascribes our Perceptions of the Rectitude of virtuous Action to this 'moral Sense', or rather makes that Rectitude entirely consist in their Correspondence with it. Whereas if there be a real rectitude in such Action, I cannot doubt but that our Understandings are capable of perceiving it. We have confessedly Ideas of Action and Agents, and find a manifest Difference among them. We find likewise that some Actions are agreeable, and others disagreeable, to the Nature and Circumstances of the Agent and the Object, and the Relations intevening between them. Thus, for Instance, we find an Agreement between the Gratitude of A and the Kindness of B; and a Disagreement between the Ingratitude of C and the Bounty of D. These Agreements and Disagreements are visible to every intelligent Observer who attends to the several Ideas. The Question then is, Whether we perceive them by our Understanding, or by what our Author calls a 'moral Sense'? And might it not as well be asked. How is it that we perceive the Agreement between three Angles of a Triangle and two Right ones? Will our Author say, that we perceive this by an Intellectual Sense superadded to our Understanding?" . . . "If the Agreement or Disagreement of one Sort of Ideas be proper Objects of our Understandings, why not those of another? Especially, since in many Cases, they are perceived with equal Clearness and Evidence. Let therefore our intelligent Faculty either be pronounced insufficient in both Cases, or in neither. Nay, since moral Perceptions are more useful and important than any other, there is peculiar Reason to conclude, that they belong to our supreme Faculty. It is not to be imagined, that the wise Author of Nature would frame our Mind in such a Manner, as to allot them only Instincts for the Purposes

¹ i. e. *Hutcheson*.

of Morality and Virtue, and at the same time grant them Reason and Intelligence for inferior Uses. This seems to me neither consistent with the Dignity of Virtue, nor the Supremacy of our rational Faculty.”¹

(B) THE SENSITIVE ASPECT OF MAN'S NATURE.

Sensibility defined. *Balquy's* usage of the term “sensibility” is very vague. The gratification of any desire, the capacity of being affected by external objects, the various instincts, passions, and acquired habits, all belong to man as a sensitive being. He therefore employs the term to denominate an aspect of the mind, and also the various propensities of the body; that is, it has a psychical and a physical connotation. The term is used by him, as its context demands, in any of the above meanings and also in its full (*Balquyan*) connotation. Whether the term be used in its wider, or in one of its narrower meanings, it has one constant significance, it has reference to the material world as distinguished from the world of reason and truth. This ignorant liberty or licentiousness in manipulating the term greatly confuses and weakens his system, as we shall endeavour to show.

The origin, nature, and function of sensibility. Instincts and passions belong to the material side of man. The former were at first implanted by God in him and have been transmitted from progenitor to off-spring (though from time to time modified) through the history of mankind. Since they are of implanted origin they can be altered by their creator and even be eliminated to make room for their contraries. In its nature an instinct is fixed; that is, it always refers to the same object. Its operation is forcible and lively and is the exact opposite of free choice and rational activity. Instinct has no moral function to execute. In man's biological history it is prior to reason. It is the great regulator of his life during the infancy of his reason, but it diminishes in its practical value as reason develops and predominates. To brutes it is indispensable for their preservation and well-being.

¹ The Part of First The Foundation of Moral Goodness. 4th Edition. pp. 69, 70.

Passions and bad habits, again, are all acquired propensities of the body. They exist because of the fact of sin. By Adam's fall man's physical nature lost its equilibrium. This derangement was propagated through the history of humanity and was further aggravated by each individual. They have taken upon themselves the function of eating away all the bases of morality and therefore aim at poisoning the root of all healthy progress. They become the enemies of life.

Again, sensibility in its psychical aspect consists of any modification of the mind due to the influence of external objects and of the various desires for natural goods. It is therefore of a relative origin, and it has always reference to a natural object. This modification exists in consciousness as an agreeable or disagreeable feeling. Such a hedonic-tone of consciousness is due to the relative fitness or unfitness of the object affecting it. What is fit and good is agreeable, what is unfit and evil is disagreeable; and vice versa. The hedonic-tone of consciousness determines the value for that consciousness of its relative object. What is agreeable; for any individual, as such, is fit and good for him. What is disagreeable for any individual, as such, is unfit and injurious for him. Hence the function of sensibility for any particular individual is to register the benefit, or the harm, of natural good in relation to that individual.

An effort to base Morality on sensibility. Mr. *Hutcheson* has made a great effort to establish morality on man's social instincts supplemented by what he calls "moral Sense". Such a conception, says *Balquy*, involves insurmountable difficulties, for it makes virtue to be of an arbitrary and a positive nature.¹ Instincts being implanted by God in man could have been otherwise created, even contrary to what they are at present, and since they are of a determinate disposition, when once implanted, they therefore destroy the possibility of free choice. Again, if good instincts had not been implanted in man, he would be, in spite or

¹ The First Part of The Foundation of Moral Goodness. 4th Edition. pp. 61—73.

his reason and intelligence, incapable of performing a single moral action, and but for the "moral Sense" would be unable to discriminate between what is good and what is evil. Further, such a scheme must allow to brutes a share of virtue. From the above mode of attack upon *Hutcheson* we are led to infer that *Balguay* has misunderstood him. Logically he must regard him as a materialist. When *Balguay* contrasts the conceptual nature of reason with the intuitive nature of moral sense, and also when he states that the introduction of such a sense into moral science reduces morality, which is absolute and universal, to what is purely relative, he is thereby induced to regard *Hutcheson's* system as being based upon what is psychical rather than on what is physical. He therefore approaches the right point of attack. But this goes but a very short way to compensate for his elaborate attack on *Hutcheson's* moral system as one based upon instincts. The attack we should have expected from *Balguay* would be one against innate ideas; but to these he only gives a secondary consideration. In our opinion, this is due to the faulty connotation attributed by him to the term "sensibility". This it is which, being a stumbling-block to the proper understanding of *Hutcheson*, therefore makes *Balguay's* attack on him valueless.

(C). IDEAL LIFE.

Remarks. We have endeavoured to explain *Balguay's* contention concerning the natures and functions of the two passive aspects of man's nature, that is, reason and sensibility. The former links man to God. It is the organ which conceives universal relations and truth. The latter links man to the material world and is the organ which registers the worth of particular things as they are found in "natural goods". We shall next endeavour to illustrate his conception of their cooperation in the formation of the ideal life.

A Life of duty or obligation. The ideal life is a life of duty, of obligation, of moral fitness. The terms "duty", "obligation", and "moral fitness" seem to be used by *Balguay* in the same connotation and he further identifies them with the motive or

the inducement to an action.¹ What is characteristic of a life of obligation is the absolute imperativeness of its precepts. It is a life based upon the law of truth. This law is immanent in man, in the universe, and in God. It is "the eternal reason of things". In its nature it is self obligatory. The law of truth, and it alone, is absolute in its own nature. The commands of God obey this law and have therefore absolute right to be obeyed. Also the commands of any human legislator, if they are based upon this law, have an absolute claim to be obeyed. No pretence to absolute authority, if not based upon this law, is conceivable anywhere. The law of truth alone ought to regulate the whole of man's life, that is, man as a sensitive and as a rational being. To live according to it is "a life of duty" . . . "a life of obligation".

Kinds of obligation. We shall next proceed to illustrate the nature of this obligation. *Balguay* says it is of two kinds, internal and external.² By the former he means moral obligation, and by the latter sensible obligation.

Moral obligation. "What is the reason inciting a man to the choice "of a Virtuous Action"?³ *Hutcheson*, says *Balguay*, wants an answer to this question, and believes it impossible to supply a satisfactory solution from the standpoint of the intellectualist, and thinks this difficulty to be insurmountable without the help of those instincts — moral sense and social propensities — which he himself has introduced for such a purpose. *Balguay* admits that, prior to the pursuit of any action, the mind becomes affected and modified. This is due not to instincts, as *Hutcheson* contends, but rather to the conception of virtue or truth. This kind of affection, unlike instinct, which is implanted in its origin and determinate in its nature, is relative in its origin and in its nature inductive. The mind, on conceiving virtue or moral relations, becomes modified. The mind when thus modified is induced towards virtue. This modification of the mind we are now speaking of, is also obliga-

¹ See below *Price's Criticism*. p. 122.

² The First Part of The Foundation of Moral Goodness. 4th Edition. p. 68. Also, The Law of Truth, 2nd Edition, pp. 372—76.

³ *Ibid.* p. 81.

tory in its nature. Its nature is that of necessity, and is analogous, or parallel to, the necessity discerned between mathematical relations. *Balguy* gives the following examples of their parallel obligation. "Between the Ideas of Bounty and Gratitude," he says, "there is a manifest Congruity, which is commonly called Moral Fitness." . . . "The Ideas of Bounty and Gratitude are so closely connected, and the Agreement between them is so visible and clear, that no Man can overlook it, or be insensible of it. The most ignorant understand it, as the most vicious are forced to acknowledge it. What is it then that knits these Ideas together and establishes the Conformity between them? Is the Agreement arbitrary, or dependent on the will of any Agent? No, not even the Creator's. It springs from the same Necessity of Nature that makes the Three Angles of a Triangle equal to two Right ones; or that fixes a certain Proportion between a Cone, and a Cylinder of the same Base and Height."¹ This parallelism holds good, says *Balguy*, up to the point of voluntary action, then it fails; for the mind assents quietly to mathematical necessity, but in morals the will has power to rebel, even when the understanding clearly conceives moral duty.

Sensible obligation. In treating of sensible obligation, *Balguy* deals with the psychical aspect of sensibility. The consideration of instincts is excluded. Obligation is not a suitable term to denominate their influence . . . instincts "compel" or "force", rather than "induce" or "oblige". The physical aspect of the term must therefore be left out when speaking of obligation.

The mind in its sensitive capacity, when affected by natural goods, becomes modified. This modification is experienced as an agreeable or disagreeable feeling. If any natural object presents itself as agreeable, we are obliged (as a rule) to pursue it and regard it as good for us. If, on the contrary, any object disagreeably affects the mind, we are obliged (as a rule) to avoid it, and regard it as injurious for us. This kind of obligation is not caused nor followed by a process of rational deliberation. The in-

¹ The Second Part of The Foundation of Moral Goodness. 2nd Edition. Answer 2.

ducement to action is immediately felt as pleasure or pain. The mind intuitively discriminates the value of natural good, just as it discriminates between colours. This rule concerning sensible obligation, unless reason intervenes with a superior motive, is always to be relied upon; for when there is no reason against gratifying the mind, the desire for gratification is a good reason for doing so. Sensible obligation in its strictest sense, is not due to the regard for pleasure in itself as an end to realise, or pain in itself as an end to avoid, but is due rather to the consideration of what the nature of self, as self, requires. The true self is a pleasant self, and is therefore desirable. A miserable self is not the true self and is therefore undesirable. The hedonic-tone of self becomes obligation, rather than pleasure, as such, or the avoidance of pain, as such. Pleasure and pain have no meaning except in relation to self. Sensible obligation, therefore, arises from the intrinsic nature of self, as self.

Obligation and Freedom. The next question which confronts us is: "How does obligation, as defined by *Balquy*, affect the will?" When denying *Hutcheson's* implanted instincts as inducements to action, he says "It seems utterly impossible to reconcile Virtue with any kind of Necessity".¹ Yet in his above account of moral obligation, he says, that such obligation partakes of the nature of necessity. This is another example of his ingenious way of using the same word to convey different, almost contrary, meanings. What he seems to mean is, that there are two kinds of necessity . . . a physical necessity and a psychical necessity. Physical necessity is mechanical in its nature, psychical necessity is a self-determinating process, instinct belongs to the former, obligation to the latter. Obligation being a self-determinating process is reconcilable with freedom of choice. Such obligation far from "compelling" or "forcing" the will to act, "pleads" with it and "induces" it to action. Moral obligation is teleological. Sensible obligation is an immediate feeling caused by a natural object. Both

¹ The Second Part of The Foundation of Moral Goodness. 2nd Edition. Answer. 6.

aspects of obligation, in *Balguy's* opinion, are in harmony with free choice.

Benevolence. The primary dictate of reason is that every moral agent should intend the good of the whole. And since moral benevolence is a dictate of reason, and not of sense, it always responds to social wants. In other words, it adapts itself to the need of man's conscious environment. But according to *Hutcheson*, the good of the whole, instead of being a dictate of reason, becomes the sole moral dictator to man, that is, benevolence becomes the ultimate motive and standard in morals. He is guilty, says *Balguy*, of failing to conceive the real meaning of moral benevolence.¹

Benevolence is of two kinds, it is either instinctive (natural) or rational (acquired).

Hutcheson regards benevolence as instinctive and natural, and forgets rational benevolence which is by far the superior. No one will deny, says *Balguy*, the social utility of natural benevolence. "Doubtless", he says, "a great Proportion of the Benefits and good Offices that are done in the World, are to be ascribed to natural Affection, either wholly or chiefly."² The self-sacrificing love of parents towards their children and of friends towards one another, the various natural desires for public good and happiness and the earnest efforts to realise them, are all praise-worthy and have real value. Though such acts have value within their own sphere, yet they have no moral value. They, he says, are no proof of the prevalence of true virtue among mankind, but rather an argument to the contrary. What they (instincts and instinctive acts) really prove is the "Wisdom and Goodness of our Creator in providing such a wonderful Supply for our natural Wants and our moral Defects". These belong to man as a sensitive, rather than as a moral being; their end is their own gratification and not virtue, hence they must be brought under the category of natural good.

¹ The First Part of The Foundation of Moral Goodness. 4th Edition. p. 77.

² Ibid. p. 76.

Moral benevolence on the other hand, according to *Balguy*, has its inducement in rational conception.¹ If we attend to the principle on which moral goodness is founded we cannot fail to conceive the intrinsic merit of virtue and become affected towards it for its own sake. This rational affection for virtue is also an affection for duty for duty's sake, and is denominated in relation to society, rational benevolence. The following will exemplify this kind of benevolence:— When receiving gratitude it can be rationally conceived, that our duty is to return good offices, according to our abilities, to our benefactors.² Or again, take the case of a person in distress. "Might we not attempt his relief even when void of natural compassion, merely from the necessity of the case, and the rectitude of the action?" "Might we not by considering the Nature of the Case, and the Circumstances of the Sufferer perceive some Fitness, some Reasonableness in the Act of Succour? Might not some such Maxim as that of doing as we would be done unto, offer itself to our Minds and prevail with us to stretch a helping Hand upon such an Occasion? In short, if we made any Use of our Understandings, they would not fail . . . to discover our Duty in such a Case".³ . . . "It would be improper and absurd to say, that we hearken to reason for the sake of our fellow Creatures; 'but it is very just and proper to say that we oblige and serve our fellow Creatures', because Reason requires it. Reason both enjoins the Duty, and prescribes the measures for it".⁴

Concerning the relation of natural and rational benevolence *Balguy* says that though the former has no claim to any moral merit it has an auxiliary value for the latter. We leave him to express it in his own words: "A benevolent Instinct is a very proper Introduction to Virtue; it may lead us, as it were, by the Hand till we arrive at a Conduct truly virtuous, and that is founded on rational Principles; and even afterwards, it may continue to

¹ The First Part of The Foundation of Moral Goodness. 4th Edition. pp. 82, 84, 85.

² Ibid. p. 50.

³ Ibid. p. 50.

⁴ Ibid. p. 88.

quicken us in our Pursuits. But, yet, as far as our Wills are determined, either by Instincts, or anything else besides Reason, so far, I think, you can have no Pretention to Merit or Moral Goodness”.¹

Self-Duty. *Balguy*, in opposition to *Hutcheson*, believes there is a real moral value in the discharge of self-duties. *Hutcheson*, he says, only allowed a relative merit to self regard.² It is only when it is directed to public good that it has, in his opinion, any moral value. *Balguy* regards such a view as being too narrow, for in addition to a moral self, which is involved in a benevolent conduct, there is also a moral merit resulting from what may be called “the discharge of self duties”. Thus he says, “Were any Man supposed alone, without any Fellow-creatures in the Universe; would there be no Merit, no moral Goodness, in the highest Improvement of his Facilities and the exactest Government of his Appetites and Inclinations? Tho he conformed all his Actions to the Rules of right Reason; checking every Desire, and denying himself every Gratification inconsistent therewith; would there be nothing laudable, nothing meritorious in such a Conduct as this?”³ *Balguy* emphatically says that such a conduct would have a real merit. Nothing, he says, is “wanting to denominate and constitute such a Behaviour truly virtuous”.⁴

But suppose any person neglects the care and culture of his mind and “gives himself up to sensual Pleasure, and subjects his Reason to his Appetites; he must renounce all Pretention to virtue”. To have a proper regard towards self, therefore, has an inherent moral value. Hence, it is an aspect of man’s duty. “The Co-existence”, says *Balguy*, “of innumerable Fellow-creatures makes room for other Duties, and another kind of Virtue; but does not cancel the Obligation we are speaking of, nor exhaust the Merit and moral Rectitude of such Actions as respect ourselves”.

Instincts. We have already endeavoured to explain the nature and functions of instincts, and so we shall but briefly notice their

¹ The First Part of The Foundation of Moral Goodness. 4th Edition. p. 76.

² Ibid. p. 98.

³ Ibid. p. 99.

⁴ Ibid. p. 100.

place in the ideal life. This we cannot do better than in *Balguy's* own words: "Considering the Frailties and Thoughtlessness of Mankind, it is but too manifest that we stand in need of Instincts and Inclinations to prompt us to what is good, and stimulate us to our Duty: and good reason there was, why we should not be trusted to ourselves, and the Dictates of our Reason, without them".¹ But on the other hand, "I can by no means look upon them as essential to Virtue; nor can I think that any Instinct has a Place in its Constitution. To speak properly, Reason was not given us to regulate natural Affection, but natural Affection was given us to reinforce Reason, and make it more prevalent. The inferior Principle must be intended as subservient to the superior, and not vice versa."² If instincts, says *Balguy*, become supreme in man's nature its ideal harmony is impaired. "However useful our Instincts may be," he says, "when under the Direction of Reason, as Nature designed; yet they are very insufficient Guides of themselves, for Human Nature; and in many Cases would lead Men aside from their true Interest, instead of bringing them to it. Consider them as undirected by Reason, and we shall find that they prompt us to prefer a trivial Enjoyment that is present, to a very great one at a Distance. They prompt us also to pursue sensual Gratifications to the Neglect of more refined Pleasures and sublimer Enjoyments. These Instincts therefore, strong and powerful as they are, must be often restrained and resisted by the Reason of every Man who pretends to act either virtuously or wisely. In many Cases, instead of gratifying, he must oppose his keenest Appetites, and most urgent Inclinations, by a generous Self-denial. He must Curb and keep in his eager Passions, lest instead of being subservient to a higher Principle, they run away with it."³

Virtue can be taught. Morality, as *Balguy* regards it, is a real science, and contrary to *Hutcheson's* opinion, it follows that it can be taught like any other true science. Thus he writes;

¹ The First Part of The Foundation of Moral Goodness. 4th Edition. pp. 50. 51.

² Ibid. pp. 75. 76.

³ Ibid. pp. 101. 102.

“Virtue may be taught, or promoted by Instruction”.¹ Such a view *Hutcheson* denied. “Agreeable enough, I confess, to his own Principles, which naturally lead him to such a Conclusion. For if Virtue consists in an Instinct, and the Effects of that Instinct, it is evident that Instruction can avail little or nothing. But if, according to the foregoing Account, Virtue consists in the Conformity of Men’s Actions to the Reasons of things; the Advantage of moral Instruction must be very manifest. For hereby the Ignorant may be assisted in discovering and perceiving which Actions are conformable, and which repugnant to the Nature and Circumstances of Agents, and the Relations thence arising. In ordinary Cases the Difference between Right and Wrong is so evident and notorious, that the most ignorant perceive it without Instruction. And yet even in these Cases it may be very useful, as it is very practicable, to shew more particularly and distinctly, the Reasonableness, the Fitness, and the Excellence of a virtuous Practice; and the Unreasonableness and Unfitness, the Odiousness and Baseness, of a vicious Conduct.”²

“And in respect of other Duties not self-evident, their Connection with such as are, may be discovered and laid open; or they may be unfolded and resolved into simple Truths, and self-evident Propositions. And as the Ignorant may thus learn what their several Duties are, so they may be induced and prevailed upon to comply with them, not only by external Motives, but by internal Reasons drawn from the Nature of Morality and Virtue. And surely it may turn to some Account, and tend to inspire Men with right Sentiments, and virtuous Purposes, to convince them how reasonable it is to do well, and how unreasonable to do ill. Such Instruction must be useful to the ignorant, and may contribute to reclaim the Vicious.”³

Concluding remarks. *Balguv* believes that virtue when thus founded on “the reasons of things” is established on what is universal

¹ The First Part of The Foundation of Moral Goodness. 4th Edition. p. 95.

² Ibid. pp. 95, 96.

³ Ibid. p. 96.

and immutable; and that such a procedure is a real advance on the sentimental theory which ultimately reduces virtue to what is particular and arbitrary. "The reasons of things" he identifies with "truth". Which in his opinion, supplies what may be called an ethical major premise, out of which all the particular duties of life, such as benevolence, self regard &c, can be inferred and welded into a systematic unity. In our opinion, such a contention has more novelty than substance. To act according to "the reasons of things", modified as such a notion is, by *Balguy*, still remains an empty ethical formula. His sharp division between reason and sensibility cannot be eradicated. The abyss between them remains unbridged; the virtuous man is he who excludes himself from the affairs of this world, and leads a life of contemplation on abstract relations; while the sensuous man loses himself in every day life and thereby neglects his intellectual culture and the highest enjoyment. Every individual has this dual capacity and is therefore divided in himself. According to *Balguy's* view (also those of *Clarke* and *Wollaston*) there is nothing in common between them. Ultimately he is obliged to renounce the claims of the sensuous man and to annihilate his existence. Consequently his ideal man becomes an ethereal entity absorbed exclusively in abstract meditation.

(II.) THE IMMORAL CONDITION OF MAN.

General remarks. In the first part of this chapter we have depicted the ideal condition of man, that is, that state in which he was first created by God. Here we have to dwell upon the actual condition of man.¹ *Balguy* is obliged to change his a priori method, in examining human nature from this standpoint. He appeals to our observation. Let every man reflect on the operations of his own mind, on his own conduct, and on that of his fellow men, let him turn through the pages of history, then let him compare all these collected facts of observation with the ideal aspect illustrated in the first part, with the dictates of his own conscience, and with the revealed commands of God. Such a procedure cannot fail,

¹ See Letters to a Deist, also "The Law of Truth" and "The Divine Rectitude".

says *Balguy*, to convince anyone that his present condition is far from being what it ought to be; that is, it is immoral, and therefore contrary to truth and the reasons of things.

Cause and Effect of Immorality. The enemy of morality needs two conditions to seduce the soul. First a free will, and secondly a negligent misunderstanding, due to the effects of passions or instincts. These are the only direct causes which can make a rational being act contrary to reason, that is, contrary to the fitness of things, or truth. The understanding, owing to carelessness, represents moral fitness not according to what it is — eternal and immutable in its nature and application — but rather according to a fanciful setting of its own. It (i. e. the understanding) disregards its real and natural conception of truth, and presents to the will, as an inducement to action, a false system of relations — a system which is particular and of imaginary origin. The will when thus impelled to action becomes a practical demonstrator for inverting the nature of things and the ideal order. Man thereby becomes a rebel against his Creator, against the universe, and against himself. This false inducement gradually metamorphoses human nature. Instead of acting as a rational being, man becomes a bundle of disorganised habits, and a slave to irrational propensities. His nature as it were, is inverted, and the inferior principle becomes superior. Not less disastrous are the effects of this misleading guide on society: self-regard becomes dominant, and the desire for public happiness is stamped out. Whether a person gives pain to a sensitive being or not is not taken, into consideration. The nature of things, when the will is thus guided, is totally disregarded; logically it is an effort to disintegrate the universe into chaos and a challenge of a finite individual to the Almighty.

Morality and Heredity.¹ The above derangement in man's logical nature started with Adam. He was the first to neglect rational conduct, and to be governed by sensibility. This resulted in impairing man's mind, in disorganising his body and in upsetting the designed harmony between the two. The principle of

¹ The Second Letter to a Deist. 2nd Edition. pp. 287—90.
Jones, John Balguy.

heredity is no factor in the history of the mind. The soul in its own eternal purity is given to every person at his birth. A guilty conscience, vain imaginations and wicked desires are totally foreign to a child. For the mental deterioration of the parents is not transmitted to their offspring. No child will be regarded as guilty and will be punished by God for the sins of his parents. Mental neglect and the consequent deterioration start anew in every individual. It is different with the history of the body. Heredity is one great factor in forming its disposition. A disorganised physical nature is propagated from progenitor to offspring. The result of this is, that every infant has a pure soul attached to a corrupt body. Consequently each individual mind starts its history in alliance with a corrupt companion. Reason therefore, in its period of innocence and feebleness, is at the mercy of a cruel and wretched body, which has unruly dispositions and lusts of long history. This fact does away with the possibility of living according to reason, for before it (reason) gains its autonomous strength it is already in the service of sensibility. In the case of fallen humanity therefore, to strive for virtue for virtue's sake is well nigh impossible.

Man still a rational being and ought to live accordingly. In spite of the calamity which has overcome human nature, man still remains a rational being, and ought to live according to the law of moral fitness. For this law ever gives forth a feeble ray of light through the medium of human reason. This light, which is called "the light of nature" reflects the principal lines of man's duty. It is to this law, says *Balguy*, that St. Paul refers: "For when the Gentiles, which have not the law, do by nature the things contained in the law, these, having not the law, are a law unto themselves: Which shew the work of the law written in their hearts".¹ The light due to what survives of this law in man, accounts for that highly rational and virtuous conduct of the ancient philosophers, who, though they were, in common with other men, the partakers of a corrupt or disorganised body, yet lived according to reason. These examples testify to the possibility

¹ The Epistle to the Romans, 2. 14, 15.

of living a pure life notwithstanding the presence of a strong resistance due to lively propensities and unruly passions. To follow the example of these men is a duty incumbent on everybody, yes, even in their degenerated state. But it is a fact which cannot be overlooked that all men are not philosophers. By far the majority of men are wholly subdued and governed by sensibility. Though such is the case, yet it does not diminish in the least the claim which "the light of nature" has, to regulate men's life and to induce them to a rational conduct.

(III). THE MEANS EMPLOYED BY GOD TO RESTORE MAN TO HIS LOST IDEAL STATE.

Religion necessary. The inability, due to sin, of man to conceive, by means of his reason, the standard of his duty, and the fact that he ought to conceive it and live up to it, is an argument from the "fitness of things" for that interference on the part of God, which resulted in introducing revealed religion. God thereby provided a means, or an auxiliary, to counteract the defects of man's reason.

Religion defined.¹ Religion, whether natural or revealed, is founded upon the will of God directed by his just reason. A purely rational endeavour to understand and obey the divine will is called natural religion; while a similar endeavour to know and obey his will, according to Bible teaching, is called revealed religion. Religion differs from pure and simple morality, in its being the product of God's will directed by his just reason; while morality is an aspect of the nature of the rational law itself, and is therefore independent of God's will. Locke and other writers, says *Balguy*, failed to make this distinction between religion and morality, and have consequently confounded the two.

Revealed Religion.² That aspect of religion, says *Balguy*, known as the revealed, has been greatly questioned in modern times,

¹ The Second Part of The Foundation of Moral Goodness. 3rd Edition. Answer 16. Also Second Letter to a Deist. 2nd Edition p. 334.

² The Law of Truth. 2nd Edition. pp. 370—72. Also The Second Letter to a Deist. 2nd Edition. p. 282.

and has been blasphemously treated by *Tindal* and the deists. But the fact is, that that concerning God and his laws which they think the product of natural religion or pure reason, is, in reality, the product of revelation. It is only by comparing the works of modern times (e. g. *Clarke's* works) with those of the ancients, who lived before Christ, that the great influence of revealed religion can be properly estimated. Even the teachings of the Deists themselves prove this, for the whole content of their thought is due to it (revelation), and their arguments against it are but the arguments for it turned, as it were, inside out. Once the extent of the havoc made by sin on man's reason is realised, no sane person will question the utility and indispensability of revealed religion.

Religion shows new moral inducements. The defects of the human reason have been supplemented by revelation in two ways. First, it has revealed the conduct and perfection of God and the duty of mankind to be like him. To have revealed the divine will, as it is guided by the eternal and immutable reasons of things, is an inducement to imitate it, which ought therefore to result in awakening in man a rational endeavour. And secondly, it has revealed the consequences, in a world to come, of a neglected duty in this world. In doing so, an inducement of the strongest kind has been brought to operate upon man's mind, which should have the effect of drawing him to the path of his duty.

Let us further elucidate the nature of these inducements.

The will of God is guided by Truth. God, as we have already remarked, conceived and always conceives, in himself, the whole system of truth, and allows his free will to be always guided by it. His conduct is clearly revealed in creation, in providence, in the redemption of mankind, and in the gift of immortality for the sake of readjusting in the next world the lost harmony due to man's sin.

Creation.¹ Take creation for example. God clearly reveals two just motives, the distribution of happiness (for there is more happiness than misery in the world) and the manifestation of order.

¹ See, "The Divine Rectitude.

These ends, different as they are, never clash with each other. They both take their origin from the eternal reasons of things, and are in fact but different aspects of that principle. Hence where perfect order is found, perfect happiness follows, and when real and not imaginary happiness is experienced, it testifies to the rectitude of that experience. By means of reason and revelation we can meditate on this marvellous piece of work (creation) and discover how wonderfully its various parts have been knitted together to execute perfectly these ends. As an example of this, take the descending gradation of conscious beings found intervening between man and the minutest example of a sensitive being. The horse is inferior to the man, the fish is inferior to the horse, the worm is inferior to the fish, &c. Thus the visible creation gives examples of innumerable stages of conscious beings, logically arranged, and with a capacity for happiness. Seeing these descending stages of beings, logically arranged below us, we are justified by revelation in inferring the presence of an invisible Creation made up of innumerable beings, in their capacity for knowledge and happiness ascending logically above us. For example, intervening between man, in his present condition, and the angel are innumerable stages of beings, orderly arranged and having a capacity for knowledge and happiness. Creation therefore always displays the manifestation of order, and the distribution of happiness, and therefore it is a stupendous and a wonderfully perfect example of a will always guided by the reasons of things.

Providence.¹ But many have argued, says *Balguv*, that God's providence over the world in no way testifies to the perfect fitness of things. How is it that some people are wealthy, healthy and happy, while others are poor, weak and miserable? Does this testify to order? For all we know, says *Balguv*, it may display the most accurate order, for the whole of God's council and doings are not revealed to us. What appears to us as misery may be our only means to real happiness. What appears to us as evil may be a suitable means of education, and the way to virtue. Fallen

¹ See, *The Divine Rectitude*.

humanity needs a state of discipline, and discipline of the most severe kind is no evil. It is only an "apparent evil". But there is what must be called a "real evil" which ends in the ruin of man! God is not to be blamed for this kind of evil, it is the outcome of man's abuse of his freedom, and he alone is responsible for it. It proves nothing against the rectitude of God. True this calamity is a discord in what was designed to be a harmonic whole, and this accounts for the further conduct of God, which is logical and necessary, as seen in the redemption of man through Christ, and in the granting of an immortality whose nature has been revealed to be dependent on man's conduct in this world.

Redemption.¹ Christ's suffering, says *Balguy*, though refuted by *Tindal* and others as irreconcilable with God's rectitude, was the direct outcome of the "fitness of things", and therefore of rectitude. He did not suffer the penalty incurred by man's sin. This would have been impossible as well as unjust. His suffering, was a voluntary suffering, full of merit, with the object of winning God's favour and of elevating man. Christ, in order to redeem mankind and to restore the lost harmony of the universe, fulfilled all the conditions demanded by God's rectitude.

Future life.² The mystery of God's providence and of man's redemption will be understood in the next world. We can infer from the principle of rectitude and revelation that the good who suffer in this world will be rewarded in the next, and that the wicked will be punished. All men will be rewarded or punished according to this principle. The capability of the soul to be wise or ignorant, happy or miserable, in the next world, depends upon the degree of justice or injustice done to it by its possessor in this world. He who improves his soul by the right means — reason and revelation — will be rewarded in the hereafter, in proportion to his success; also, he who neglects his soul and the means of its improvement will be punished accordingly in the next world. In addition to the effort or neglect on the part of man, we must also

¹ See The Essay on Redemption.

² See Sermons on Immortality.

take into consideration his natural endowment, a gift which varies considerably with each individual. The world to come will therefore be a stupendous whole of infinite variety, which will be harmonised and unified by the principle of the "fitness of things". If we may so express it, it will be a final representation of the principle of fitness painted in light and shade.

Imitation of God's conduct only a moral auxiliary. The above delineation of God's conduct shows, says *Balguy*, how the Divine will is always guided by the eternal and immutable reasons of things. God bids every man to imitate his perfect conduct and thereby become governed by the same principle. But should such an effort to imitate the Divine conduct end in nothing more than a forced or a mechanical imitation, it would not have any moral merit. The value of such an inducement wholly lies in its being able to fulfil its designed purpose as an auxiliary to awaken rational conduct. Man's conduct is moral when reason is self-operative.

Rewards and punishments.¹ Rewards and punishments, considering the feebleness of a deteriorated reason, are also indispensable auxiliary inducements to a moral life. To reveal the condition of man in the world to come, as wholly dependent upon the nature of his conduct in this world, must be of great concern to any one who has the minimum of that quality, which entitles him to the name of a rational being. No rational being, unless totally ruined by sin, can free his mind from the consideration of his own future fate and condition. *Shaftesbury*, says *Balguy*, because he failed to reconcile such a regard to self with a regard to others contends, though admitting its utility in some cases, that all future considerations are detrimental to what is purely moral. His Lordship, he says, fails to conceive the difference between a regard self in relation to this world and a regard for self in relation to the next world. It is true that he who acts in this world from self-interest tramples upon the rights of his fellow men and wholly neglects his duty towards them, thereby becoming the object of their

¹ The First Letter to a Deist is written from this point of view.

jealousy and hatred. It breeds that temper and spirit which is the exact contrary to benevolence. But he who acts with a view of being rewarded in the hereafter displays quite the contrary conduct to the pure egoist. In fact the desire for a future reward is a social desire, it has its origin in the idea of an eternal happy family . . . the idea of being in a happy communion with immortal beings and with God himself. This kind of desire, therefore, has the effect of drawing men towards one another and of inducing them to live for one another in this world. It breeds that "goodness of temper" required by *Shaftesbury* as a condition of benevolence. In a word, the desire of any individual for rewards in the next world can not, as his Lordship maintains, be reduced totally to self-interest, for in its effects it becomes benevolence. Therefore, says *Balquy*, since this kind of self-interest does not destroy benevolence, but rather is a condition of it, the champion of the sentimental school does it injustice when stating that it diminishes the worth of the moral motive and thereby of morality itself.

Though such good effects, says *Balquy*, result from a regard for future rewards and punishment, yet, it must be remembered that they are not moral ends in themselves, but rather moral means or auxiliaries. They are effective helps promulgated by God to meet the needs of a fallen humanity. Their aim is to awaken unmindful sinners. And what is more effective to arouse the soul from its slumbering condition, than to bring the visions of eternal torture or happiness to operate upon it? When the soul is awakened to reflect upon truth and therefore to the pursual of virtue for its own sake, future rewards and punishments can be dispensed with. Until this ideal state is revived, the utility of these moral auxiliaries can not be disputed.

Concluding remarks. *Balquy*, as we have pointed out, in order to adapt his system to meet the needs of a deteriorated reason, has found it necessary to supplement it with religious inducements. These, he says, fall under the category of external obligation, and since they are based upon the law of truth they possess its self-obligatory nature. *Balquy*, considering the present condition of man, seems to regard his conception of the ideal man as existing only

in philosophic literature. He candidly confesses that to realise such an ideal is well-nigh impossible. For the reason has been impaired and has consequently lost its designed vigour. *Balguys* finds it necessary, therefore, to base practical morality upon religious considerations. And as we saw him annihilating the claims of sensibility and giving them to reason, so here again, we find him renouncing the claims of reason in moral matters, and giving them to what he calls religious obligations. Ultimately, though not conscious of it, *Balguys* founds morality on the will of God.

We have not entered upon any exhaustive criticism of *Balguys's* ethical thought, but have endeavoured to bring the various aspects of it to bear upon each other so that they may criticise themselves.

PART IV.

BALGUY'S ETHICAL INFLUENCE.

Introduction. To most students of moral philosophy *John Balguy* is a total stranger. A brief, but erroneous, reference is made to him by *Hunt*¹ as one who had attacked *Shaftesbury*. Also, *Fowler*² mentions him as one who had been influenced by *Hutcheson*. *Leslie Stephen*³ too, grudgingly alludes to him. The first in England to regard *Balguy* as being worthy of rank among the British Moralists was *Selby-Bigge*,⁴ and afterwards in Germany, *R. Falckenberg*.⁵ The two last mentioned are the only gentlemen who regard *Balguy* as having had any influence on British ethics and we believe that, though his influence was not great and far reaching, they are perfectly justified in their contention.

We shall only consider the writers who have made explicit reference to *Balguy*.

Tippling Silvester. A divine named *Tippling Silvester*, in a sermon preached at the University of Oxford on July 25th, 1734, undertook to criticise *Balguy's* essay on "The Foundation of Moral Goodness".⁶ *Hutcheson* and *Balguy*, he says, represent extreme and opposite views. The former founds morality on instincts and affections, the latter founds it exclusively on reason. Both writers, says *Silvester*, are wrong. For morality which is based, as *Balguy*

¹ "Religious Thought in England." Vol II pp. 362—365; Vol III pp. 87—89.

² "*Shaftesbury and Hutcheson*" (English Philosophers Series) pp. 216—18.

³ "English Thought in the 18th Century." Vol 2 p. 11. 2nd Edition.

⁴ "British Moralists" (Selections). 1897.

⁵ *Geschichte der neueren Philosophie*. 5th Edition. 1905.

⁶ A Sermon on Moral and Christian Benevolence. 1734.

and others contend, on the reasons of things, is not in the least destroyed by a natural affection. Both reason and natural affection co-operate in the formation of a moral life.

John Brown. Also *Brown* in his "Essays on the Characteristics", refers twice to *Balguy's* essay on "The Foundation of Moral Goodness".¹ First, he says, *Balguy*, who contends, like *Clarke*, "that Virtue is acting according to the "Absolute Fitness of things" has been compelled to admit that morality is a matter not of ratiocination, but of pure intuition. Such a confession, says *Brown*, is valuable testimony, that ultimately the difference between the intellectualists and the sentimentalists is only a verbal one. Both schools share the same difficulties, they both lack a precise and intelligent definition of virtue.

Secondly, to contend, he says, as *Wollaston* and *Clarke* have done, that virtue is the conformity of our moral actions to the reasons of things, is vague and almost meaningless.² Such a formal definition of virtue has no content and is far from being absolute and universal. For example, *Wollaston* regards speaking to an inanimate object as being irrational, but he dares not call it an immoral one; while he regards an insult to a human being as being immoral because of its unfitness. Both are examples, says *Brown*, of acting contrary to the fitness of things, yet, they cannot both be regarded as immoral. These and similar examples make the above definition of morality quite absurd. *Balguy*, he says, is aware of this and has aimed to remedy its defects. He affirms that "Moral Actions are such as are knowingly directed towards some Object intelligent or sensible". That is, he narrows the sphere of morality, as defined by *Wollaston* and *Clarke*, and bases it on the relations interceding between conscious beings. This attempt of *Balguy*, says *Brown*, also fails. The moral formula even within its narrower sphere lacks its assumed universality. Thus *Brown* says: "And so far indeed this Refinement approaches towards the Truth, as it excludes all inanimate Things from being the Objects of moral Good

¹ p. 118. 1st Edition.

² "Essays on the Characteristics". p. 127. 1751.

and Evil. Yet even this idea of moral Beauty, Fitness, or Truth, is highly indeterminate and defective: Because innumerable Instances may be given, of Actions directed towards Objects sensible and intelligent, some of which Actions are manifestly becoming, fit, or true, others as manifestly incongruous, irrational and false, yet none of them, in any Degree, virtuous or vicious, meritorious or immoral. Thus to speak to a Man in a Language he understands, is an Action becoming, fit, or true; 'tis treating him according to the Order, Relations, and Truth of Things; 'tis treating him according to what he is. On the contrary, to speak to him in a Language he understands not, is an Action neither becoming, fit, nor true; 'tis treating him according to what he is not; 'tis treating him as a Post. But although the first of these Actions be undeniably becoming, fit, or true, who will call it Virtue? And though the latter be undeniably incongruous, irrational and false, who will call it Vice? Yet both these Actions are directed towards a Being that is sensible and intelligent. It follows therefore, that an Action is not either morally Good or Evil, merely because it is conformable to the Beauty, Fitness, or Truth of Things, even though it be directed towards an Object both sensible and intelligent, but that something still further, some more distinguishing and characteristic Circumstance is necessary in order to fix its real Essence."¹

Richard Price. The one, who in our opinion, has been mostly influenced by *Balguys*, is *Richard Price*. In support of this statement we beg to submit the following facts:

First, *Price* in his Review speaks of *Balguys* as "an ingenious and able writer", and therefore, one who has considerable weight attached to his contentions.²

Secondly, *Price* has submitted the following criticism on *Balguys*.

(A). *Price* understood *Balguys's* conception of the beautiful to signify that the beautiful is an inherent quality of objects. It exists, therefore, independently of its perception. With such a con-

¹ *Essays on the Characteristics* p. 127.

² *Review of the principal questions . . . in Morals.* 3rd Edition. p. 185.

ception *Price* fails to agree. Thus, he says: "An able writer on these subjects, tells us that, after some doubts, he at last satisfied himself, that all beauty, whether natural or moral, is a species of absolute truth; as resulting from, or consisting in, the necessary relations and congruities of Ideas. It is not easy to say what this means. Natural beauty will be considered presently. And as to moral beauty, one would think that the meaning must be, that it denotes a real quality of certain actions. But the word beauty seems always to refer to the reception of pleasure; and the beauty, therefore, of an action or character, must signify its being such as pleases us, or has an adaptness to please when perceived."¹

Concerning the opinion "that natural beauty is a real quality of objects" *Price* says, "It seems impossible for anyone to conceive the objects themselves to be endowed with more than a particular order of parts, and with powers, or an affinity to our perceptive faculties, thence arising; and if we call this beauty, then it is an absolute inherent quality of certain objects; and equally existent whether any mind discerns it or not. But surely order and regularity are, more properly, the cause of beauty than beauty itself."

(B). *Price* also regards *Balquy's* treatment of obligation as rather loose. *Balquy* contends that obligation and motive are synonymous. *Price* says that, though obligation contains a motive, all motives are not obligatory in their nature. Thus he writes: "An ingenious and able writer defines obligation to be a state of the mind into which it is brought by perceiving a reason for action. Let this definition be substituted wherever the words duty, should, oblige, occur; and it will soon be seen how defective it is. The meaning of it is plainly, that obligation denotes that attraction or excitement which the mind feels upon perceiving right or wrong. But this is the effect of obligation perceived, rather than obligation itself. Besides, it is proper to say, that the duty or obligation to act is a reason for acting; and then this definition will stand thus: obligation is a state of the mind into which it is brought by perceiving obligation to act. This author divides obligation into external (sen-

¹ Review of the principal questions . . . in *Morals*. 3rd Edition. pp.98,99.

sible) and internal (rational); by the former, meaning the excitement we feel to pursue pleasure as sensible agents; and by the latter the excitement we feel to pursue virtue as reasonable and moral tagents. But, as merely sensitive beings we are incapable of obligation; otherwise it might be properly applied to brutes, which I think, it never is. What, in these instances, produces confusion is not distinguishing between obligation and the effect of it; between obligation and a motive. All motives are not obligations; though the contrary is true, that wherever there is obligation, there is also a motive to action.”¹

Thirdly:

(a.), *Price* adopts without modification *Balguy's* contention regarding the relation of instincts to reason. *Balguy* maintained that by making reason the supreme principle in man all his instincts, though heterogeneous and hostile to it, would be properly governed and done justice to, and would thereby, in spite of their hostility to reason, react upon it and in some cases quicken its dictates. *Price* adopts this view, as we have said, without modification.

Balguy says, “natural Affection” (i. e. instinct) “was given us to reinforce Reason, and make it more prevalent” . . . “A benevolent Instinct is a very proper Introduction to Virtue; it may lead us as it were, by the Hand, till we arrive at a Conduct truly virtuous, and that is founded on rational Principles; and even afterwards it may continue to quicken us in our Pursuits. But yet, as far as our Wills are determined, either by Instinct, or anything else besides Reason, so far, I think, we can “have no Pretention to Merit or Moral Goodness”.²

What the service of instincts signifies in such cases is “the wisdom and goodness of the creator, in providing such a wonderful supply both of our natural wants and our moral defects”.

Price is also of the opinion that, “in men it is necessary that the rational principle, or the intellectual discernment of right

¹ Review of the principal questions . . . in *Morals*. 3rd Edition. pp. 185, 186.

² The First Part of The Foundation of Moral Goodness. 4th Edition. p. 76.

and wrong, should be aided by instinctive determinations. The dictates of mere reason, being slow, and deliberate, would be otherwise much too weak. The condition in which we are placed, renders many urgent passions necessary for us; and these cannot but often interfere with our sentiments of rectitude. Reason alone, (imperfect as it is in us) is by no means sufficient to defend us against the danger to which, in such circumstances, we are exposed. Our maker has, therefore, wisely provided remedies for its imperfections; and established a due balance in our frame by annexing to our intellectual perceptions sensations and instincts, which give them greater weight and force.”¹

The most frequent cases, with both *Balquy* and *Price*, in which reason is quickened by instincts, are found in the youth of the individual. Instincts are prior to reason. But, as reason develops and gains its autonomous character, they lose their auxiliary function. The ideal man is he who curbs his instincts and acts rationally.

(b.), *Price* also adopts *Balquy's* distinction between rational and instinctive benevolence and also his contention that the former is much superior to the latter.

Balquy writes, “It seems to me an useful and material Distinction, to consider the Affection of Benevolence, either as instinctive, or as rational, as natural or as acquired; acquired, I mean by Reason, Reflection, and a consequent Practice. If we attend to the Reasons on which moral Goodness is founded, we discover its Rectitude and intrinsic Fitness. Why then may not this very Perception produce benevolent Affection, or a real Desire of Public Good? and this Desire continue prompting Men to generous Pursuits, and be strengthened by suitable Practice? Is not such a rational Benevolence more agreeable to rational Natures, and more meritorious than a blind Instinct that we have in common with inferior Creatures, and which operates, as it were, mechanically, both on their Minds and ours? . . . It cannot, I think, be denied, but that calm, universal Benevolence, . . . is more owing to Reason

¹ Review of the principal questions . . . in *Morals*. 3rd Edition. pp. 95, 96.

and Reflection than natural Instinct, where ever it appears. And supposing us naturally void of public Affection, I doubt not but Reason and Reflection would rise such a Benevolence as this, in considerate Minds.”¹

Price in his Review says, that, “Benevolence . . . is of two kinds, rational and instinctive, rational benevolence entirely coincides with rectitude, and the actions proceeding from it, with the actions proceeding from a regard to rectitude . . . But instinctive benevolence is no principle of virtue, nor any actions flowing merely from it virtuous. As far as this influences, so far something else than reason and goodness influence, and so much I think is to be subtracted from the moral worth of any action or character.”²

. . . “Actions proceeding from universal, calm, and dispassionate benevolence, are by all esteemed more virtuous and aimable than actions producing equal or greater moments of good, directed to those to whom nature has particularly linked us, and arising from kind determinations in our minds which are more confined and urgent. The reason is, that in the former case the operations of instinct have less effect, and are less sensible, and the attention to what is morally good and right is more explicit and prevelant.”³

Fourthly, besides the above quotations several others may be produced from both *Balguy* and *Price*, but we think them sufficient to show that *Price* adopts *Balguy*’s contention regarding the relation between reason and instinct and also between it and benevolence. This being evident, the following account of *Price* by *Leslie Stephen* is as true of *Balguy* as it is of *Price*.

Witness the following:— “*Shaftesbury* and *Hutcheson* had popularised the theory of moral sense. *Price* understood them to mean that our moral judgments were merely the dictates of a blind instinct, in which the intellect had no share” . . . He argues in opposition to this theory, which would certainly have been disowned by its supposed sponsors, that the intellect has not only a share in laying

¹ The First Part of The Foundation of Moral Goodness. 4th Edition. p. 77.

² Review of The principal questions . . . in Morals. 3rd Edition. pp. 323, 324.

³ Ibid. p. 325.

down moral laws and enforcing our obedience, but that it operates, or ought to operate, without the assistance of the emotions. Yet, on the other hand, "he cannot altogether dissociate our emotions from our actions, he endeavours to represent the passions as properly subsidiary to the intellect, and as superfluities of which we might rid ourselves entirely in a higher state of existence" . . . "The occasion for them (our passions and appetites) arises entirely from our deficiencies and weakness. Reason alone, did we possess it in a higher degree, would answer all the ends of them."¹

. . . "Not only are the affections superfluous, but any given action is deprived of its merit in so far as they are present. The intellectual determination is, he says, the only spring of action in a reasonable being, so far as he can be deemed morally good and worthy, and the only principle from which all actions flow which engage our esteem of the agents. It follows that instinctive benevolence is no principle of virtue nor are any actions flowing merely from it virtuous. As far as this influences, so far something else than reason and goodness influence, and so much I think is to be subtracted from the moral worth of any action or character."²

In our opinion the above summary of *Price* is also a good delineation of *Balguy's* teaching. *Price's* doctrines quoted above from his Review of the principle questions in morals had been already propounded by *Balguy* thirty years before. Hence we are led to differ from *Leslie Stephen*, and claim in this matter the position which he has assigned to *Price* for our author.

Concluding remarks. *Balguy* can by no means be regarded as a philosopher of the first rank, nor even, as a second-class thinker. He must be satisfied with a humble position somewhere in the back ground. But in spite of this he is fully entitled to be ranked among the English moralists of the eighteenth century. He has faithfully expounded the doctrines of *Clarke*. He has betrayed his misconception, like many of his contemporaries, of *Shaftesbury's* and *Hutcheson's* teaching, which testifies, to a certain extent, that at that

¹ English Thought in the 18th Century. 2nd Edition. Vol. II pp. 12, 13, 14.

² Ibid.

time they were underestimated. His original contributions are not numerous but they all show signs of an ingenious mind which fully grasped certain aspects of the current thought. We believe that, as we have tried to show he has exercised some influence, probably more than we have admitted, on *Price*.

We hope that this humble effort of ours, in spite of its defects, represents fairly accurately *Balguy's* teaching and that it will be of help, should anyone undertake a further study of the subject.

End.

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¹ The numbers such as. 109. g. 22 &c. refer to the British Museum Catalogue.

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Veröffentlichungen der Gesellschaft für fränkische Geschichte

Die Gesellschaft für fränkische Geschichte hat sich die Aufgabe gestellt, die bisher unveröffentlichten, wertvollsten **Quellen** zur Geschichte Frankens den modernen Anforderungen der Geschichtswissenschaft entsprechend herauszugeben und einschlägige **Forschungen** auf dem Gebiete fränkischer Geschichte anzuregen und zu fördern.

Im besonderen sollen die chronologischen Aufzeichnungen der fränkischen Städte, die Urkunden der Kollegiatstifter und Klöster, der städtischen Gemeinwesen und Adelsgeschlechter der Forschung zugänglich gemacht werden; interessant werden namentlich die Quellenpublikationen und Bearbeitungen aus dem Gebiete der Wirtschaftsgeschichte sein: Rechnungsbücher, Urbare, Zins- und Lehenbücher der Herrschaften, Weistümer und Stadtrechte, Rats- und Zunftbücher harren der Veröffentlichung, die Landtagsakten der verschiedenen fränkischen Territorien der Bearbeitung.

Eines besonderen Hinweises auf die Bedeutung all dieser Publikationen bedarf es für den Fachmann nicht. Lag doch Franken fast im Mittelpunkte des alten Reiches. Neben Schwaben, Alemannien und den rheinischen Gebieten war hier der vornehmste Schauplatz der Wirksamkeit unserer Könige und Kaiser. Die öffentlich-rechtlichen und privatrechtlichen Einrichtungen dieses Gebietes haben im weiten Umkreise als Muster gedient. So dürften diese Publikationen auch wichtige Beiträge zur allgemeinen deutschen Geschichte bringen. Subskribenten auf alle Veröffentlichungen der Gesellschaft, die in etwa halbjähriger Folge erscheinen werden, genießen einen um 20% gegenüber dem Ladenpreise ermäßigten Subskriptionspreis.

Bisher erschienen:

Chroniken der Stadt Bamberg. Erste Hälfte. Chronik des Bamberger Immunitätenstreites von 1430—1435. Mit einem Urkunden-Anhang. Nach einem Manuskripte von TH. KNOCHENHAUER neu bearbeitet und herausgegeben von Prof. Dr. ANTON CHROUST in Würzburg. gr. 8. LXXVII u. 368 S. geh. M. 15.—. Subskriptionspreis M. 12.—.

Diese älteste Geschichtsaufzeichnung bürgerlicher Kreise, die uns aus Bamberg erhalten ist, betrifft die Streitigkeiten, die sich insbesondere im vierten Jahrzehnt des 15. Jahrhunderts zwischen der Bürgerschaft des Stadtgerichts und dem Klerus in Bamberg wegen der gesetzlichen Immunitäten zugetragen, zum Einschreiten von Kaiser, Papst und Baseler Konzil und zu einem Zusammenprall dieser Gewalten führten. Eine richtige Ergänzung des natürlich parteiisch gefärbten Berichtes bilden die im Anhang mitgeteilten Urkunden, die interessante Aufschlüsse über rechtliche und wirtschaftliche Verhältnisse geben.

Der zweite, in Vorbereitung befindliche Halbband, dem auch das Register des ersten beigegeben wird, enthält zwei Berichte über den Bauernaufstand in Bamberg (1525) und zwei über Bambergs Schicksale in der Markgrafenfehde (1553).

Zusammen bilden diese Aufzeichnungen die **Fortsetzung** der von der Historischen Kommission in München herausgegebenen **Chroniken der deutschen Städte**.



Leipziger historische Abhandlungen

Herausgegeben von

E. Brandenburg

Prof. a. d. Universität Leipzig

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In der vorliegenden Sammlung werden in zwangloser Reihenfolge monographisch kritische Forschungen aus allen Gebieten der Geschichte zur Veröffentlichung gelangen. Die Herausgeber gedenken damit in erster Linie eine Auswahl der besten Untersuchungen, die auf ihre Anregung hin im Historischen Institute der Leipziger Universität entstanden, weiteren Kreisen zur bequemen wissenschaftlichen Verwertung zugänglich zu machen.

Es sollen sich daran aber auch historische Studien anderer Gelehrten anschließen, die zur Leipziger Universität in Beziehung stehen und gleiche wissenschaftliche Ziele wie die Herausgeber verfolgen. Darin, daß sich die Vertreter der alten, mittleren und neueren Geschichte an der Universität Leipzig zur Herausgabe dieser Studien vereint haben, liegt eine Gewähr für die Mannigfaltigkeit der hier gebotenen Arbeiten.

Die einzelnen Hefte der Sammlung sind in sich abgeschlossen, von einander unabhängig und einzeln käuflich. Beim Bezuge der ganzen Sammlung tritt ein um 20% ermäßigter Subskriptionspreis ein.

Heft 1:

Bisher erschienen:

Karl V. Plan zur Gründung des Reichsbundes.

Ursprung und erste Versuche bis zum Ausgange des Ulmer Tages (1547). Von Dr. O. A. HECKER. gr. 8. IX u. 101 S. Geh. M. 3.40. Subskriptionspreis M. 2.80.

Den Geschichtsforscher, der das Leben und Wirken Karls V. in den Rahmen seiner Darstellung zieht, wird der deutsche Krieg von 1546—1547 mit seinen Begleit- und Folgeerscheinungen immer von neuem zur Untersuchung aller Einzelvorgänge anreizen. Denn die genaue Kenntnis der Geschichte dieser Jahre ist unerlässlich für jeden, der die ganzen ferneren Handlungen Karls V. verstehen will. Unter den einzelnen Plänen, die der Enkel Maximilians damals zu verwirklichen strebte, wird in der historischen Literatur immer wieder die Betreibung eines großen Reichsbundes mit verfassungsreformatorischer Tendenz erwähnt. Obwohl sich dieser Plan in der Geschichte allgemein mit dem Namen des Bundestages von Ulm verbindet, gibt es doch noch keine eingehende Darstellung dieser merkwürdigen Tagsatzung. Das vorliegende Buch will nun den Versuch machen, dem Werden und Wachsen dieser kaiserlichen Reichsbundesidee ebenso wie der Entwicklung der entgegenstrebenden Bewegungen einmal im einzelnen nachzugehen, um, zusammen mit den Vorgängen in Ulm selbst, auf diese Art ein abgerundetes Bild des ganzen Projektes und seiner Bedeutung geben zu können.

Heft 2:

Kritische Forschungen zur Österreichischen Politik

vom Aachener Frieden bis zum Beginne des Siebenjährigen Krieges. Von Privatdozent Dr. JAKOB STRIEDER in Leipzig. gr. 8. VIII u. 101 S. Geh. M. 3.40. Subskriptionspreis M. 2.80.

Die vorliegende Studie ist ein neuer Beitrag zu der so interessanten Periode europäischer Politik von 1748—1756. Die diplomatische Arbeit Österreichs in der Friedenszeit dieser Jahre wird anhand eines um-

fassenden archivalischen Materials untersucht, insbesondere die österreichisch-französischen Beziehungen beleuchtet und andere Zwecke und Ziele in der Politik Maria Theresias und des Grafen Kaunitz aufgezeigt, als die Forschung bisher annahm. Zwei unveröffentlichte Staatschriften des Grafen Kaunitz gelangen im Anhang zum Abdruck.

Heft 3:

Fahnlehn und Fahnenbelehnung im alten deutschen Reich von Dr. J. BRUCKAUF. gr. 8. VI u. 113 S. Geh. M. 3.60. Subskriptionspreis M. 3.—.

Die Untersuchung behandelt zunächst das Fahnlehn nach der Lehre der mittelalterlichen Rechtsbücher unter gleichzeitiger Berücksichtigung der verschiedenartigen Interpretationen, welche die einschlägigen lehnsrechtlichen Sätze der Spiegler erfahren haben. Hierauf wird die Fahnlehnstheorie der Rechtsbücher an der Hand zahlreicher urkundlicher und sonstiger literarischer Nachrichten des frühen Mittelalters einer Prüfung unterzogen. Ein besonderes Kapitel beschäftigt sich dann mit dem Investiturstadium und den bis zum 13. Jahrhundert gebräuchlichen Investitursymbolen, dem sich Erörterungen über Fahnlehn und Fahnenbelehnung bis zum Aufhören der öffentlichen Belehnungen gegen Ende des 16. Jahrhunderts anschließen. Eingehendere Berücksichtigung erfährt u. a. die Verwendung des Zepters bei den Investituren weltlicher Fürsten, das Auftreten der mannigfaltigen Lehensfahnen und -fähnchen, sowie die Übertragung der gräflichen Lehen. Auch des Gebrauchs der Fahne als Investitursymbol im schwedischen, dänischen und polnischen Reiche wird ergänzend gedacht. Mit der Entwicklung der Thron- und Reichshofrats-Lehen und den sich anschließenden Streitigkeiten über den Charakter der Grafenlehen gelangt die Untersuchung zum Abschluß, die namentlich auch wegen der Zusammenstellung des einschlägigen Materials für die früheren Jahrhunderte des alten Reiches interessieren dürfte.

Heft 4:

August der Starke und die pragmatische Sanktion (1719—1755). Von Dr. ALBRECHT PHILIPP. gr. 8. VIII u. 160 S. Geh. M. 5.—. Subskriptionspreis M. 4.—.

Die Abhandlung bringt eine Darstellung der kursächsischen Politik in den letzten Jahren Augusts des Starken; sie setzt ein mit der Verheiratung des sächsischen Kurprinzen mit Maria Josepha, der ältesten Tochter Kaiser Josephs I. im Jahre 1719 und bricht mit dem Tode Augusts des Starken 1755 ab. Auf Grund reichen archivalischen Urmaterials wird die augusteische Großmachtpolitik im Rahmen des europäischen Staatensystems und mit besonderer Rücksicht auf den Konkurrenzkampf der deutschen Territorien um die Vormacht in Deutschland

dargestellt. Das durch die Ansprüche Maria Josephas auf das habsburgische Erbe bedingte Verhältnis zu Österreich wird einer eingehenden Würdigung unterzogen und dadurch die Grundlage zum Verständnis der späteren sächsischen Politik, insbesondere der Brühls, geschaffen.

In Vorbereitung befinden sich:

Heft 5: Beitrag zur Geschichte des Reichstages im 15. Jahrhundert.
Von Dr. R. Bemmann.

Heft 6: Soziale Gliederung im Frankenreich. Von Dr. J. Vormoor.

Die Quellen der „Rerum Frisicarum historia“ des
Ubbo Emmius. Von Dr. H. REIMERS. gr. 8. VI u.
286 S. geh. M. 5.—.

Die Untersuchung behandelt eine Frage, welche für die Geschichte Frieslands und der niederländischen Provinzen Groningen und Westfriesland von der größten Bedeutung ist. Emmius' Historia, die für die Geschichte der genannten Gebiete im 14.—16. Jahrhundert die Hauptquelle bildet, ist bisher noch nicht im Zusammenhange auf seine Quellen untersucht. Da er selbst nach Art seiner klassischen Vorbilder mit Quellenangaben zurückhaltend ist, so war auf Grund der Historia allein ein klares Bild von Umfang und Art des benutzten Materials nicht zu gewinnen. Den entscheidenden Aufschluß mußte der umfangreiche literarische Nachlaß des Emmius geben. Dieser ist hier zum ersten Male im vollen Umfange herangezogen. Bei der reichen Fülle der von Emmius benutzten Quellen bietet deren Untersuchung zugleich einen Überblick über die meisten älteren friesischen Chroniken und einen Teil des ostfriesischen und groningischen Urkundenmaterials überhaupt.

Die babylonische Geisteskultur in ihren Beziehungen zur Kultur-
entwicklung der Menschheit. Von Prof. Dr. H. WINCKLER in Berlin.
8. IV u. 152 S. geh. M. 1.—, in Originalleinenband M. 1.25.

Verfasser stellt die babylonische Kultur in den Mittelpunkt orientalischer Kulturentwicklung und untersucht, wie diese nach allen Seiten ausstrahlte und zur Bildung einer einheitlichen Weltanschauung und Wissenschaft beigetragen hat. Astronomie, Maße und Gewichte, Zeitrechnung, Mythologie und Mythos, Kult der Götter etc. werden geschildert und die Entwicklung der bibl. Religion in ihren Beziehungen zum Kulturleben des Orients dargelegt.

David und sein Zeitalter. Von Prof. Dr. B. BAENTSCH in Jena.
8. 160 S. geh. M. 1.—, in Originalleinenband M. 1.25.

Das Bändchen gibt ein möglichst deutliches Bild von David als Regenten, Kriegsmann, Politiker und Menschen und eröffnet ein richtiges Verständnis für die weit über das davidische Zeitalter hinaus wirkende Bedeutung dieses Mannes. Da aber das genannte Zeitalter nicht nur für die Geschichte des alten Israel von weittragendster Bedeutung gewesen ist, sondern auch zu den größten überhaupt gehört, die wir in der Geschichte kennen, so bietet die vorliegende Darstellung nicht nur eine Geschichte von Davids Leben und Wirken, sondern stellt diese Periode in die großen, geschichtlichen Zusammenhänge des alten Orients hinein.

Christus. Von Prof. Dr. O. HOLTZMANN in Gießen. 8. IV. u. 148 S. geh. M. 1.—, in Originalleinenband M. 1.25.

Nachdem einleitend die besonderen Schwierigkeiten einer wissenschaftlichen Arbeit über Christus beleuchtet sind, wenden sich die folgenden Abschnitte Jesu Heimat und Volk, den Quellen seines Lebens und deren Glaubwürdigkeit zu, erzählen sein Leben und würdigen seine Lehre. Ein Schlußkapitel stellt das Glaubensurteil der verschiedenen Zeiten über die Person Jesu dar.

Mohammed und die Seinen. Von Prof. Dr. H. RECKENDORF in Freiburg i. B. 8. IV. u. 134 S. geh. M. 1.—, in Originalleinenbd. M. 1.25.

Verfasser will in vorliegender Arbeit eine Schilderung der Verhältnisse geben, unter denen sich die Begründung des Islam vollzog. Neben diesen religionsgeschichtlich so interessanten Fragen steht das biographische Moment im Vordergrund der Darstellung. Mohammed tritt uns entgegen als Mensch und Religionsstifter, Staatsmann und Heerführer. Überall wird die psychologisch so merkwürdige Persönlichkeit in ihren Eigentümlichkeiten erfaßt und in ihrem Verhältnis zur Umwelt geschildert. Indem aber auch Mohammeds politischer Tätigkeit eine besondere Würdigung zuteil wird, bieten die Ausführungen die Grundlagen für das Verständnis der mohammedanischen Welt überhaupt und ihrer Staatenbildung.

Politik. Von Prof. Dr. FR. STIER-SOMLO in Bonn. 8. IV u. 166 S. geh. M. 1.—, in Originalleinenband M. 1.25.

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TEIL I. I. Politische Bildung. — II. Bedeutung politischer Bildung. — III. Grundbegriffe. Einteilungen. — IV. Verstands- und Gefühlspolitik. Real- und Idealpolitik. Staatsromane. — V. System der wissenschaftlichen Politik. — VI. Aufgaben wissenschaftlicher Politik. — VII. Die Politik im Kreise der Wissenschaften. — Die Literatur zur Politik und Staatslehre.

TEIL II. Erstes Kapitel: I. Begriff und Wesen des Staates. — II. Die natürlichen und sittlichen Grundlagen der Staatenbildung und Staatenerhaltung. —

III. Entstehung und Untergang der Staaten. — IV. Die Lehre von der Rechtsfertigung des Staates. — Zweites Kapitel: Die staatlichen Elemente. — I. Das Staatsgebiet. — II. Das Staatsvolk. — III. Die Staatsgewalt. — Drittes Kapitel: Das Zweckproblem. Die Staatszwecke. — Viertes Kapitel: Die Lehre von den Staatsformen und Staatsverfassungen. — Fünftes Kapitel: Die Lehre von den Staatsorganen. — Sechstes Kapitel: Einheitsstaat und Staatenverbindungen. — Siebentes Kapitel: Die politischen Parteien.

Die Deutsche Reichsverfassung. Von Geh. Rat Prof. Dr. PH. ZORN in Bonn. 8. IV u. 120 S. geh. M. 1.—, in Originalleinenband M. 1.25.

Die Aufgabe, die sich der Verfasser gestellt hat geht dahin, die Grundzüge des deutschen Reichsstaatsrechtes darzustellen. Im ersten Kapitel wird die deutsche Staatsentwicklung der Neuzeit in den Rahmen der preußischen, deutschen und Weltgeschichte, unter vergleichender Heranziehung der Staatsentwicklung der anderen europäischen Kulturvölker, eingefügt. Ein zweites Kapitel erbringt den Nachweis, daß das heutige Deutsche Reich nicht ein lösbares Vertragsverhältnis unter Staaten, wie der alte Deutsche Bund darstellt, woran sich im dritten Kapitel der positive Nachweis des Staatscharakters des Reiches anschließt. Das vierte Kapitel gibt sodann die Darstellung der Organisation des Reiches in Kaisertum, Bundesrat, Reichstag und Reichsbehörden. Soweit als tunlich sind hierbei stets die Verfassungsbestimmungen behufs eigener Nachprüfung des Gedankenganges durch den Leser mitgeteilt.



Breslauer Beiträge zur Literaturgeschichte

Herausgegeben von

Max Koch und Gregor Sarrazin.

Neue Folge.

Die Vereinigung der beiden Herausgeber, der Vertreter deutscher und englischer Literatur an der Universität Breslau, bekundet, daß der Rahmen dieser bereits auf das Beste eingeführten Sammlung weit genug gezogen ist. Auch in der Neuen Folge der Beiträge werden Arbeiten aus den verschiedenen literarhistorischen Gebieten erscheinen, sowohl größere tüchtige Erstlingsarbeiten, als auch Arbeiten älterer erprobter Forscher. Bei Subskription auf 10 Hefte, welche nicht der Reihenfolge des Erscheinens nach entnommen werden müssen, ermäßigt sich der Preis des einzelnen Heftes um 20%.

Bisher erschien:

Neue Folge Heft 1 (der ganzen Reihe 11. Heft):

Das Gasel in der deutschen Dichtung und das Gasel bei Platen. Von Dr. HUBERT TSCHERSIG. gr. 8. ca. 240 S. geh. ca. M. 8.—, Subskriptionspreis ca. M. 6.40.

Nach einer Betrachtung des Gasels im Orient geht der Verfasser zu dem bedeutendsten deutschen Gaselendichter über, zu Platen. Er gibt ein Bild der Geschichte, Stoffe und Form der Gaselen Platens, die er dann durch die anderen Schöpfungen dieses Dichters, durch Hafis, Goethes Westöstlichen Diwan u. a. erläutert. Ein letzter Hauptteil behandelt das Gasel in der deutschen Dichtung von seinem ersten Auftauchen (Herder, Fr. Schlegel, Goethe) bis zu Hugo v. Hofmannsthal und Liliencron; Schweizer und Deutschösterreicher nehmen darin eine bedeutende Stellung ein. Es folgt eine Kritik der Versuche, den Gaselreim zur deutschen Volksdichtung (Schnaderhüpfel) in Beziehung zu bringen. Den Abschluß bildet die Frage nach dem ästhetischen Wert des Gasels.

In Vorbereitung befinden sich:

Aristophanes in der deutschen Dichtung.	Karl von Holtei als Dramatiker.
Henrick Steffens in Breslau und seine Dichtung.	Raupachs historische Dramen.
Der schlesische Schulmann, Historiker und Dichter Mansa.	Das englische Drama Arden of Feversham.
	Byrons Thyrsa.

Unser Deutsch. Einführung in die Muttersprache von Geh. Rat Prof. Dr. FR. KLUGE in Freiburg i. B. 8. VI u. 148 S. geh. M. 1.—, in Originalleinenband M. 1.25.

Kluge stellt zehn Vorträge zur Geschichte und Pflege unserer Sprache zusammen, die alle ein großes Talent gemeinverständlicher Darstellung beweisen. . . Wir haben uns gegenüber der Wortkunde Kluges nur dankbar lernend zu verhalten und zumal in den Vorträgen über Standessprachen uns der kulturhistorischen Erfassung der Entwicklungen zu erfreuen.

Prof. Dr. Richard M. Meyer. Deutsche Literaturzeitung 1907 Nr. 1.

Es ist eine Freude, von diesem kundigen Führer in gefälliger Form über die neuesten Ergebnisse unserer Sprachwissenschaft belehrt zu werden. Besonders der letzte Aufsatz, der zur Gründung eines Reichamtes für deutsche Sprachwissenschaft anregt, wird allgemeines Interesse erwecken.

Privatdozent Dr. Werner Deetjen. Hannoverscher Kurier, 21. Dez. 1906.

Der Sagenkreis der Nibelungen. Von Prof. Dr. G. HOLZ in Leipzig. 8. IV u. 128 S. geh. M. 1.—, in Originalleinenband M. 1.25.

Verfasser behandelt die über die ganze germanische Welt des Mittelalters, besonders über Deutschland und Skandinavien verbreiteten, vielbesungenen Erzählungen von Siegfrieds Heldentum und Tod, sowie von dem ruhmreichen Untergange des Burgundervolkes durch die Hunnen. Entstehung und Weiterbildung der Sage werden geschildert, ein Einblick in die Quellen gewährt, die nordische wie germanische Überlieferung auf Form und Inhalt untersucht. Durch Gegenüberstellung dieser verschiedenen Überlieferungen, insbesondere in den Liedern der Edda und im Epos von „der nibelungen not“ wird die Sage auf ihre älteste Gestalt zurückgeführt und ihre geschichtlich-mythische Grundlage aufgezeigt. Die letzten Abschnitte behandeln die Entwicklung der Sage in der Literatur, sowie die an die verschiedenen Formen der Überlieferung anknüpfenden Streitfragen und ihre Lösung.

Die Poesie des alten Testaments. Von Univ.-Prof. Dr. phil. et theol. E. KÖNIG in Bonn. 8. IV u. 164 S. geh. M. 1.—, geb. M. 1.25.

Unter vergleichender Heranziehung der arabischen und babylonischen Literatur wird hier die althebräische Dichtung nach Form und Inhalt eingehend untersucht, psychologisch und ästhetisch analysiert und so nach den Gesichtspunkten der allgemeinen Poetik dargestellt.



Abhandlungen zur Philosophie und ihrer Geschichte

Herausgegeben von

Prof. Dr. R. Falckenberg in Erlangen

Ziele und Aufgaben dieser Sammlung sind ähnliche wie bei den Leipziger historischen Abhandlungen. Es erscheinen jährlich 6—8 Hefte in zwangloser Reihenfolge. Auch hier genießen die Subskribenten der ganzen Reihe eine Preisermäßigung von 20%.

Heft 1:

Bisher erschienen:

Die philosophische Scholastik des deutschen Protestantismus im Zeitalter der Orthodoxie. Von Privatdozent Lic. et Dr. phil. E. WEBER in Halle. gr. 8. VIII u. 128 S. geh. M. 3.50. Subskriptionspreis M. 2.80.

Zu der bunten Reihe von Übergangserscheinungen, welche für das Auge des modernen, durch Kant hindurchgegangenen Betrachtens der philosophischen Bewegung des 16. und 17. Jahrhunderts ihr charakteristisches Gepräge geben, gehört auch die philosophische Scholastik des deutschen Protestantismus. Hervorgewachsen aus der Reaktion gegen den im Ramismus sich noch einmal zusammenfassenden Humanismus, angeregt und gefördert durch die sich ausbildende theologische Scholastik, der sie als Mittel für ihre Arbeit dient, kennzeichnet sie trefflich die Geisteskultur der Zeit. Auf den ersten Blick nur Scholastik, als solche ein unnatürlicher Ableger einer vergangenen Größe, zeigt sie doch bei eindringender Untersuchung den verborgenen, aber folgenreichen Einfluß der beiden Faktoren der neuen Zeit, den Einfluß von Reformation und Renaissance. Aus den nebelhaft verschwommenen Gebilden der scholastischen Metaphysik hebt sich der programmatische Entwurf einer transzendentalen, erkenntnistheoretischen Metaphysik heraus, auch das Ideal der modernen, nicht mehr grundlegenden, sondern abschließenden, die Einzelwissenschaften verarbeitenden Metaphysik taucht am Horizonte auf, und die Logik reicht in Georg Gutke unter der Tendenz zur „Wissenschaftslehre“ mit der Forderung doppelter Begriffsbildung über Kant hinaus den modernsten Bestrebungen zu einer logischen Grundlegung der Geisteswissenschaften die Hand. In diese innere Bewegung der Philosophie, deren größter Schüler Leibniz ist, einen Einblick zu geben, ist die Absicht der vorliegenden Arbeit. Sind es auch nur An-

sätze, in denen sie das Walten des modernen Geistes in der philosophischen Arbeit der deutschen Orthodoxie nachweisen kann, so glaubt sie doch für ihren Gegenstand das Interesse beanspruchen zu dürfen, das die Philosophiegeschichte jedem Boten einer neuen Zeit entgegenbringt.

In Vorbereitung befinden sich:

Heft 2: Schellings Kunstphilosophie. Die Begründung des idealistischen Prinzips in der modernen Ästhetik. Von Dr. Max Adam.

Heft 3: Die Lehre vom Zufall bei E. Bontoux. Von Oberlehrer Dr. Otto Boelitz in Brüssel.

Schellings Vorlesungen über die Methode des akademischen Studiums 1803. Neu herausgegeben mit Einleitung und Anmerkungen von Dr. OTTO BRAUN. 8. XXIII u. 170 S. geh. M. 2.60, in Originalleinenband M. 3.20.

Die grundlegenden Gedanken obiger Schrift dürften gegenwärtig geradezu aktuell sein, denn Schellings Vorlesungen sind nicht nur ein lebendiges Zeugnis jenes blühenden Idealismus, der in der Blütezeit deutscher Spekulation auf unseren Universitäten herrschte, sondern sie halten auch unserer zum Spezialistentum neigenden Zeit das Ideal einer großen Einheit der Wissenschaft vor, vertieft durch eine metaphysisch-künstlerische Weltanschauung. In glänzender Sprache geschrieben, erscheinen sie berufen, auch in der modernsten Bestrebung zur Konzentration und wahren Kultur vertiefend und klärend einzugreifen.

Akademische Monatshefte, Jahrg. XXIII, 12. Heft.

Schellings geistige Wandlungen in den Jahren 1800—1810. Von Dr. OTTO BRAUN. 8. 76 S. geh. M. 1.60.

In der vorliegenden aus Eukens Schule hervorgegangenen Untersuchung sucht der Verfasser die letzten Triebfedern in der Weltanschauung Schellings klarzulegen, die sich aus ihnen ergebende Ausgestaltung des Weltbildes zu schildern und den eigentümlichen Lebens-typus zu zeichnen. Insbesondere verfolgt er anhand von Schellings Schriften die so tiefgehenden Wandlungen, die den Philosophen in den Jahren 1800—1810 von Optimismus und Lebensdrang zu einer der Lebensverneinung zuneigenden Weltanschauung führten.

Kunst und Philosophie bei Richard Wagner.

Akademische Antrittsvorlesung v. Prof. Dr. RAOUL RICHTER. 8. 50 S. Geschmackvoll broschiert M. 1.—.

„Die knappe, oft nur andeutende Behandlung gerade der interessantesten und tiefsten Fragen erklärt sich aus der notwendigen Be-

grenzung . . . Um so mehr muß die Kunst und das weise Maßhalten anerkannt werden, die es dem Leser ermöglichen, die Fülle des Stoffes in seiner vielgegliederten Anordnung als schöne klare Einheit zu erfassen. Hinweisen möchte ich nur auf die Erörterung der Stellung Wagners zu Feuerbach und Schopenhauer und die lehrreiche Darlegung der eigentümlichen Verknüpfung, welche die durchaus entgegengesetzten Tendenzen dieser beiden Denker in Wagners Geist erfahren.“

Dr. W. Olshausen. Beil. der Münch. allg. Ztg. 1906.

„In dieser hervorragenden prachtvoll durchgearbeiteten gedankenüberreichen Antrittsrede behandelt Richter zwei richtige Wagner-Probleme: 1. Wie verhalten sich Künstler und Philosoph Wagner ‚zueinander‘ und 2. Wie gestalten sich bei Wagner die Beziehungen von Kunst und Philosophie überhaupt.“

P. Friedrich. Die Gegenwart. 36. Jahrg. Nr. 12.

In Vorbereitung befinden sich:

Kinderpsychologie. Von Privatdozent Dr. MAX BRAHN in Leipzig. gr. 8. ca. 200 S. geh. ca. M. 2.60, in Originalleinenband ca. M. 3.20.

Ein großes Beobachtungsmaterial hat sich langsam angesammelt, das von allen Seiten das Kindesleben klären will. Leider hat die psychologische Verarbeitung mit der Stoffsammlung nicht gleichen Schritt gehalten. In Deutschland ist noch kein Werk von einem Psychologen verfaßt worden, das die Psychologie des Kindes als Ganzes vom psychologischen Standpunkt behandelt. Dazu wird hier der Versuch gemacht. Hierbei zieht der Verfasser nicht nur das früheste Kindesalter, wie dies bisher meist geschehen, in den Rahmen seiner Untersuchung, sondern er legt den Schwerpunkt auf das spätere Alter bis weit in die Schulzeit hinein, welche Betrachtungsweise ihn zu einer durchaus neuen Auffassung führt.

Die Lehre von der Aufmerksamkeit. Von Prof. Dr. E. DÜRR in Bern. gr. 8. ca. 160 S. geh. M. 2.60, in Originalleinenband geb. M. 3.20.

Verfasser behandelt eines der interessantesten Probleme des Seelenlebens. Geistige Produktion, Denk- und Willenstätigkeit werden daraufhin untersucht, ob nicht auch hier die Fülle der Erscheinungen durch wenige einfache Gesetze beherrscht werden. Die gewonnenen Ergebnisse dürften nicht nur wissenschaftlich wertvoll, sondern auch für das praktische Leben bedeutungsvoll sein.



Die bildende Kunst der Gegenwart. Ein Büchlein für jedermann. Von Hofrat Dr. JOSEF STRZYGOWSKI, ord. Prof. a. d. Universität Graz. gr. 8. XII u. 278 S. Mit 68 Abb. Geschmackvoll brosch. M. 4.—, in Originalleinenband M. 4.80.

Aus dem Inhalt: Monumentalbau — Denkmalbau — Privatbau — Kunstgewerbe — Ornament — Bildhauerei — Zeichnung — Handzeichnung, Zeichenunterricht und künstlerische Erziehung — Malerei. Mißachtung des Gegenstandes. Malerei für Feinschmecker. Landschaft: Monumentalmalerei. Böcklin und Goethes Psalm an die Natur. Anhang: Kunststreit, Reichstag und Liebermann.

Diese mitten in das Leben der Gegenwart eingreifenden Bekenntnisse werden durch eine freimütige Aussprache das Nachdenken über Dinge anregen, die für gewöhnlich nur allzu vogelfrei dem Alltagsleben ausgeliefert bleiben. In geistvoller Weise zieht der Verfasser das gesamte moderne Kunstschaffen in den Rahmen seiner Untersuchung, wertet unter ständigem Rückwärtsschauen auf die durchlaufene Entwicklung ihre Leistungen und forscht nach ihren tiefsten Wesensbedingungen. So wird dies von echter Begeisterung erfüllte Buch auf uns, die wir der Menge der modernen Kunstrichtungen und ihren Versuchen oft ratlos gegenüberstehen, klärend einwirken. Es wird unsere meist allzu flache Kunstanschauung vertiefen, unser Verhältnis zu den bildenden Künsten verinnerlichen, und unserem rastlosen Suchen nach Idealen, an denen unser Gemüt sich erheben kann, die Richtung weisen.

„Strzygowski genießt in Fachkreisen einen wohlbegründeten Ruf. Diesmal wendet er sich auch an die breiteren Schichten des Laienpublikums. Das Buch ist außerordentlich lesenswert. Vor allem ist es von einem geschrieben, der ein wirkliches, persönliches Verhältnis zur Kunst im allgemeinen wie zur modernen Kunst im besonderen hat, der auf das Wesen der Sache losgeht, nicht auf Äußerlichkeiten . . . In jedem Falle bringt das geistvolle Buch eine Fülle von Gedanken, wirft Probleme auf, regt zum selbständigen Denken an und ist jedermann, der sich für die Kunstfragen interessiert, die uns jetzt bewegen, wärmstens zu empfehlen.“

A. F. Seeligmann. Neue freie Presse. 15. V. 07.

In Vorbereitung befinden sich:

Die französische Miniaturmalerei und ihr Verhältnis zur Malerei in Nordwesteuropa von den Zeiten des heiligen Ludwig bis Philipp von Valois. Von Privatdozent Dr. GEORG GRAF VITZTHUM. gr. 8. 170 S. mit 50 unedierte Tafeln in Lichtdruck, in Büttenumschlag brosch. ca. M. 14.—.


Vorliegende Arbeit ist ein Beitrag zu den seit mehreren Jahren in Angriff genommenen Forschungen über die spätmittelalterliche Kunst in Frankreich. Hat sich das Interesse bisher wesentlich auf die Blüteepochen

um die Mitte des 13. und in der zweiten Hälfte des 14. Jahrhunderts erstreckt, so sucht der Verfasser die dazwischen liegende Übergangszeit an der Hand von wesentlich unpubliziertem Material aufzuklären.

Im ersten Kapitel schildert er die Entwicklung der Pariser Miniaturmalerei nach dem Tode des hl. Ludwig bis gegen 1300 und setzt dazu in Parallele die gleichzeitige Malerei in England. Das zweite Kapitel bringt den Versuch einer Gruppierung und, soweit möglich, Lokalisierung der nicht in Paris entstandenen nordfranzösischen, sowie der belgischen Handschriften des gleichen Zeitraumes mit besonderer Berücksichtigung ihres Verhältnisses zu Paris und zu England. Der Entwicklung in Paris von ca. 1300 bis zu den durch die neueren englischen Publikationen bekannten des Pucelle und seines Kreises ist das dritte Kapitel gewidmet. Hierbei ergibt sich die Feststellung eines starken Übergewichtes der englisch-belgischen Kunst über die Pariser Tradition, das im Schlußkapitel auch an der gleichzeitigen Malerei im Gebiet von Maas, Mosel und Rhein nachgewiesen wird.

Lessings Laoköon in gekürzter Fassung herausgegeben von
Dr. AUGUST SCHMARSOW, Geh. Rat, ord. Prof. a. d. Universität Leipzig. Textausgabe: 8. IV u. 66 S., brosch. M. — 40.
Kommentar für die Hand des Lehrers: ca. 160 S., geh. M. 2.60.

Diese gekürzte Textausgabe will allen Lesern dienen, denen es darauf ankommt, den Gedankeninhalt der Schrift möglichst rein zu erfassen und dessen meisterhafte Darstellung frei von gelehrtem Beiwerk zu genießen. Unter diesem Gesichtspunkte hat es der Herausgeber unternommen, alle jene Bestandteile auszuschneiden, die für den heutigen Leser veraltet erscheinen. Dabei konnte er z. T. nach Lessings eigenem Willen verfahren, der für spätere Ausgaben eine Anzahl Kapitel weggelassen wissen wollte. So dürfte dies Büchlein sowohl für die private Lektüre wie insbesondere für den Gebrauch in der Schule besonders geeignet sein. Die Anmerkungen der Textausgabe beschränken sich auf das Unentbehrlichste, um dem „Kommentar“ und den „Erläuterungen“, die in einem eigenen Bändchen folgen, nicht vorzugreifen.



Die moderne Physik. Ihre Entwicklung. Von L. POINCARÉ.

Übertragen und mit Anmerkungen versehen von Privatdozent Dr. Brahn in Leipzig. 8. ca. 200 S., geh. ca. M. 2.80, geb. ca. M. 3.40.

Das Buch gibt einen klaren und interessanten Überblick über die Entwicklung der modernen Physik in den letzten Jahrzehnten. Der bekannte französische Physiker faßt in Kürze die Arbeiten aller Kulturenationen zusammen und zeigt die großen Veränderungen, welchen alle Probleme in Inhalt und Auffassung in den letzten Jahren unterworfen gewesen sind. Den in allerletzter Zeit in den Vordergrund getretenen Fragen werden umfangreiche Kapitel gewidmet, so der Jonentheorie, den Kathodenstrahlen, den radioaktiven Körpern, der Telegraphie ohne Draht, ganz besonders den Beziehungen zwischen Äther und Materie, die augenblicklich so stark diskutiert werden. Doch werden außerdem die theoretisch wichtigen Grenzgebiete von Chemie und Physik auseinandergesetzt, die sonst den Physikern weiter abliegen. Die historische und theoretisch-philosophische Behandlung der physikalischen Messungen und der Grundprinzipie bildet den glänzendsten Teil des Werkes. Der Stil ist einfach und klar, das Werk insbesondere für Naturforscher aus anderen Gebieten als der Physik und für Laien geschrieben.

Die Elektrizität als Licht- und Kraftquelle. Von Privatdozent Dr. P. EVERSHEIM in Bonn. 8. IV u. 160 S. mit zahlreichen Abbildungen, geh. M. 1.—, geb. M. 1.25.

Die wichtigsten elektrischen Vorgänge werden erläutert und begründet und jene Fragen beantwortet, die sich beim Anblick der tausenderlei „elektrischen Dinge“ stellen, denen wir fast täglich begegnen.

Eiszeit und Urgeschichte des Menschen. Von Univ.-Prof. Dr. J. POHLIG in Bonn. 8. VIII u. 141 S. mit zahlreichen Abbildungen, geh. M. 1.—, geb. M. 1.25.

Der Verfasser entrollt auf Grund der neuesten, streng wissenschaftlichen Forschungen ein Bild von den landschaftlichen Wirkungen des Eises, der Bildung der Flußtäler und Höhlen, dem Leben des Urmenschen und seiner tierischen und pflanzlichen Begleiter.

Schmarotzertum im Tierreich und seine Bedeutung für die Artbildung. Von Hofrat Univ.-Prof. Dr. L. v. GRAFF in Graz. 8. IV u. 132 S. mit zahlreichen Abbildungen, geh. M. 1.—, geb. M. 1.25.

Zum ersten Male wird hier von einem unserer ersten Zoologen die wichtige Rolle eingehend dargestellt, die dem Parasitismus für die Entstehung der Arten zukommt. Sorgfältig ausgewählte, reich illustrierte Beispiele geben die Grundlagen für die allgemeinen Erörterungen unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der Parasiten des Menschen.



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— Jährlich 8—12 Hefte. —

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Einzeln bestelle ich:

Chronik des Bamberger Immunitätenstreites von 1430—1435. Herausgegeben von Prof. A. Chroust in Würzburg. gr. 8. XXVII u. 368 S. Geh. M. 15.—.

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Das Gasel in der Deutschen Dichtung und Graf Platens Gaselen von Dr. H. Tschersig. gr. 8. ca. VIII u. 240. S. Geh. ca. M. 8.—.

Die philosophische Scholastik des deutschen Protestantismus im Zeitalter der Orthodoxie. Von Privatdoz. Lic. et Dr. phil. E. Weber. gr. 8. VIII u. 128 S. M. 3.50.

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Bismarck . . . Prof. D. O. Baumgarten
Schlußwort . . . Prof. D. W. Hermann

Frei von dem auf religiösem Gebiete entbrannten Streite der Meinungen und Richtungen will dieses Werk aus den Federn unserer bewährtesten Kräfte auf theologisch-historischem Gebiete in seiner Zusammenfassung ein großzügiges, lebensvolles Bild von der Entwicklung des Christentums geben, in seinen einzelnen Teilen aber uns die großen Persönlichkeiten als Typen christlicher Frömmigkeit vor Augen führen in ihren äußeren Lebensschicksalen, in der Entwicklung ihres Seelenlebens, ihrer Stellung zu Gott, ihrer Erfassung und Fortbildung des christlichen Gedankens. Das Werk will dem ständig wachsenden Wunsche weiter Kreise nach gediegener religiös-erbaulicher Literatur entgegenkommen, es will insbesondere vorbereiten und anspornen, tiefer in die religiösen Probleme einzudringen. So werden „Unsere religiösen Erzieher“ von neuem lebensvoll unter uns weilen und segensreich beitragen zur Ausprägung des einen christlichen Geistes.

Der Sinn und Wert des Lebens für den Menschen der Gegenwart

Von Geheimrat Professor
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Die neue Schrift des großen Jenaer Philosophen wendet sich an die immer wachsende Schar derer, die nach Klarheit über die Grundfragen menschlichen Seins ringt. Sie stellt unser Leben in seinen verschiedensten Äußerungen in ein durchaus neues Licht, vermag so zu neuen positiven Ergebnissen zu gelangen und neue Richtlinien für eine sinngemäße Lebensführung aufzustellen.